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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS)l provides that "[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.,,2 This grant of 
jurisdiction is usually read narrowly to protect only the most fundamental 
international human rights such as those prohibiting torture or war crimes. Several 
courts have, in fact, been unwilling to accept broader claims to a right to life or a 
healthy environment and thereby have rejected environmental claims under the 
ATS.3 
Contrastingly and in a major departure from existing law, the District Court 
for the Central District of California concluded in 2002 that under the A TS 
residents of Papua New Guinea had a cognizable tort claim against Rio Tinto, an 
international mining company, for allegedly polluting international waters with 
mining waste.4 In reaching this decision, the court found that the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention),5 which prohibits 
marine pollution affecting international waters, codified customary international 
law that may provide the basis of a claim under the ATS even though the United 
States has never ratified UNCLOS.6 Even though it ultimately dismissed the case, 
the district court's decision in Sarei I that UNCLOS constitutes customary 
international law cognizable under the ATS could enable plaintiffs to bring 
customary international law claims based on several Multilateral Environment 
Agreements (MEAs) that the United States has never ratified provided that a 
sufficiently large number of other nations have recognized that the agreement at 
issue implicates specific, universal, and obligatory norms of international law. 
Nevertheless, the court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims as presenting 
nonjusticiable political questions.? The court alternatively dismissed the UNCLOS 
claim under the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of international comity. 8 
1 28 U.S.c. § 1350 (2006). Some courts and commentators have referred to the statute 
as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), but the Supreme Court in a recent case referred to it 
as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004); see 
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. 1. INT'L L. 587, 587 (2002) 
(characterizing the reference of the ATS as the Alien Tort Claims Act as less accurate). 
228 U.S.C. § 1350. 
3 See infra Part II. 
4 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (Sarei I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1160--63 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 
affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'd in part, 
vacated in part, rev'd in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 
F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS], available at http://www.un.org/Depts/ 
los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. 
6 See United States v. Kun Yun ]bo, 465 F. Supp. 2d 618,624-25 (E.D. Tex. 2006); 
Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161-62. 
? Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1208-09. 
8 ld. at 1208. 
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The Ninth Circuit delayed hearing the Sarei decision on appeal until the U.S. 
Supreme Court resolved an important ATS case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.9 The 
Court released its opinion in 2004 and held that federal courts should allow A TS 
suits based on principles of contemporary international law only if those norms 
have both wide acceptance and definite content comparable to those recognized as 
causes of action in the Judiciary Act of 1789, especially piracy, as is discussed in 
Section IV.1O Sosa emphasized that courts had recognized only a small number of 
A TS causes of action in 1789 and stated that courts today should be cautious about 
recognizing A TS claims based on evolving norms of modem international law. II 
In a 2006 decision, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, a divided three-judge panel of the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that UNCLOS constitutes 
customary international law that is cognizable under the ATS.12 The Ninth Circuit 
assumed that UNCLOS met the Sosa decision's standard because the Convention 
has been widely adoptedY On April 12, 2007, however, in response to the 
defendant's petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc, the three-judge panel 
withdrew its 2006 opinion and issued a superseding opinion and dissent. 14 The 
majority did not decide whether the plaintiffs' substantive claims were valid, but 
did conclude that the allegations were sufficiently serious to warrant the exercise 
of federal jurisdiction. IS The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of 
all claims as nonjusticiable political questions and vacated the district court's 
dismissal of the UNCLOS claims on act of state and comity grounds, for 
reconsideration in light of its opinion. 16 
On August 20,2007, the Ninth Circuit ordered that the case be reheard by the 
en banc court. 17 The order stated that "[t]he three judge panel opinion shall not be 
cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth Circuit, 
except to the extent adopted by the en banc court.,,18 The Ninth Circuit's decision 
to grant a rehearing by the en banc court may reflect its concern about an overly 
9 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
10 Id. at 732. 
II Id. at 732-33. 
12 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (Sarei I!), 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'd in 
part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en bane reh 'g granted, 
499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). Judge Bybee, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the 
plaintiffs must first exhaust any legal remedies available in Papua New Guinea; he did not 
address whether UNCLOS claims are cognizable under the ATS. Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 
1100-01 (Bybee, 1., dissenting). 
13Id. at 1078 (majority opinion). 
14 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (Sarei II!), 487 F.3d 1193, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2007), en 
bane reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). Judge Bybee in his dissenting opinion 
again argued that the plaintiffs must first exhaust any legal remedies available in Papua 
New Guinea; he did not address whether UNCLOS claims are cognizable under the ATS. 
Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1224-46 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
15 Sarei Ill, 487 F.3d at 1203 (majority opinion). 
16Id. at 1223-24. 
17 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (Sa rei IV), 499 F.3d 923,924 (9th Cir. 2007). 
18Id. 
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broad interpretation by the three-judge panel opinion, although it is impossible to 
know until the circuit issues its opinion in the case. On rehearing en banc, the 
Ninth Circuit should hold that the UNCLOS claim is not cognizable under the A TS 
because the content of UNCLOS is not as definite as the norms recognized in 
1789. 
Even though plaintiffs may not cite the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 
decision, in the future they will likely rely on its reasoning to try to convince courts 
to recognize UNCLOS and other environmental claims under the ATS. Because 
there are likely to be future cases involving UNCLOS and other environmental 
claims under the ATS, it is important to analyze whether the Ninth Circuit's 
reasoning in its withdrawn 2006 decision was convincing. On remand, the district 
court should hold that the UNCLOS claim is not cognizable under the A TS 
because the content of UNCLOS is not as definite as the norms recognized in 
1789. 
Although sympathetic to the goals of environmental plaintiffs, this Article 
argues that most international environmental law principles, including those in 
UNCLOS, are generally too vague to be the basis of an ATS suit under Sosa's 
definiteness standard. Neither the district court decision in Sarei nor the Ninth 
Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision addressed whether UNCLOS has a definite 
content comparable to the causes of action recognized in 1789 and thus failed to 
meet the standard for ATS suits in Sosa. The Sarei decision's conclusion that 
UNCLOS codifies customary international law is reasonable because most 
countries have ratified the Convention and the United States recognizes a number 
of its provisions. 19 The fact that UNCLOS is widely accepted in the international 
community and constitutes customary international law is not enough to make the 
Convention cognizable under the ATS because the Convention's marine pollution 
provisions are vague in many respects and thus do not have a definite content 
comparable to 1789 causes of action. A weakness of both the district court decision 
in Sarei and the court of appeals' withdrawn 2006 decision is that neither opinion 
addressed UNCLOS' s specific provisions. This Article examines UNCLOS' s 
marine pollution provisions, especially its requirement that States avoid causing 
transboundary pollution. The Article discusses the one major transboundary 
pollution dispute brought before an UNCLOS arbitration panel. Because many of 
UNCLOS's terms are indefinite and there is little international case law about its 
marine pollution provisions, this Article concludes that international arbitration 
panels would be better suited to address a transboundary pollution claim than 
federal courts in an A TS suit. 
Even under a broad interpretation of Sosa, most principles in international 
environmental agreements such as "sustainable development" are simply too vague 
to be enforceable.20 Courts should generally reject ATS suits based on the general 
language or principles in MEAs because they do not possess a definite content 
comparable to those recognized in 1789 and thus fail to meet the Sosa standard. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
20 See infra notes 98, 272-275 and accompanying text. 
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International courts and arbitration procedures are better suited to addressing 
transboundary pollution issues than American courtS.21 Following Sosa, courts in 
A TS suits should usually recognize only serious human rights abuses such as 
torture as comparable to those recognized in 1789.22 Like the Sosa court, this 
Article would leave the A TS door open to the possibility of an environmental suit, 
but only in rare cases where international environmental law is both widely 
adopted and very clear. 
Part II will review the history of the ATS before the Supreme Court's seminal 
Sosa decision. Part III will review A TS decisions involving environmental claims 
before the Sosa decision. Part IV will explore the Sosa decision. Part V will 
discuss the district court decision in Sarei and the Ninth Circuit's 2006 and 2007 
decisions. Part VI will demonstrate that customary international law requiring 
States to avoid harmful trans boundary pollution is too vague to serve as the basis 
of an A TS suit. It will also show that UNCLOS' s provisions are too vague to meet 
the Sosa standard for A TS suits. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: 
THE EVOLUTION OF A TS CASES FROM FILARTIGA TO SOSA 
A. History of the ATS 
The first Congress enacted the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789.23 The 
original language of the A TS gave the district courts "cognizance, concurrent with 
the court of the several States, or circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes 
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.,,24 From 1789 until 1980, there were only two successful ATS 
suits, while more suits based upon the statute were rejected.25 
As amended, the ATS currently provides that "[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. ,,26 The A TS 
explicitly authorizes a plaintiff to bring a claim under a treaty ratified by the 
United States, although ATS claims based on treaties have been rare.27 
21 See infra notes 567-571 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text. 
23 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
24Id. 
25 See James Boeving, Half Full . .. or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Tort 
Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 110 & n.6 
(2005) (noting that in the ATS precedent leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, two cases successfully invoked the ATS jurisdiction while three 
cases unsuccessfully invoked ATS jurisdiction). 
26 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
27 See 28 U.S.c. § 1350; see also Boeving, supra note 25, 116-17 (stating that a tort 
cause of action that violates a United States treaty remains largely unexamined). 
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Additionally, the A TS provides for suits under the "law of nations.,,28 
B. The Law o/Nations: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala and Its Progeny 
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a Paraguayan family brought an A TS suit against a 
former Paraguayan police chief for inflicting torture that resulted in the death of a 
family member.29 In 1980, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs could sue the 
defendant under the A TS because torture by a state official violates the law of 
nations and therefore is actionable under the ATS.30 In reaching this decision, the 
court determined that the ATS was not limited to rights recognized in 1789, and 
instead, found that "[it] is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it 
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world 
today .,,31 Yet the Filartiga court also held that evolving norms of international law 
are enforceable under the ATS only if they command the '''general assent of 
civilized nations. ",32 "This requirement," according to the court, "is a stringent 
one.,,33 Finally, the court explained that the law of nations "may be ascertained by 
consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general 
usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing 
that law.,,34 
Following Filartiga, most courts interpreted the ATS's reference to the "law 
of nations" to require a plaintiff to prove that a defendant had violated a broadly 
recognized principle of customary international law.35 Several decisions and 
commentators interpreted Filartiga to require that a plaintiff prove a violation of 
customary international law, which is defined as international norms that most 
States have adopted and recognized as mandatory legal obligations-opinio juris.36 
28 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
29 630 F.2d 876,878 (2d Cir. 1980); see Boeving, supra note 25, at 110. 
30 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 ("[W]e find that an act of torture committed by a state 
official against one held in detention violates established norms of the international law of 
human rights, and hence the law of nations."). The court also found that the ATS simply 
authorizes suits in "the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by 
international law." Id. at 887. 
31 !d. at 881. 
32Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)). 
33Id. (quoting Paquete, 175 U.S. at 694). 
34 !d. at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820). 
35 See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp. (Flores II), 414 F.3d 233,247-50 (2d Cir. 
2003) (holding that ATS cause of action in tort includes violation of customary 
international law); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. (Beanal III), 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that A TS cause of action in tort can stem from customary international 
law); Paul E. Hagen & Anthony L. Michaels, American Law Institution & American Bar 
Association Continuing Legal Education, The Alien Tort Statute: A Primer on Liability for 
Multinational Corporations (May 5--6, 2005), available at http://www.westiaw.com (type 
"SK046 AU-ABA 121" into Citation field) (summarizing precedent that ATS cause of 
action in tort includes violation of customary international law). 
36 See, e.g., Flores II, 414 F.3d at 254 (holding that plaintiff must allege violation of a 
HeinOnline -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 1091 2007
2007] USING ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES To SUE UNDER THE A TS 1091 
Some courts have interpreted the "law of nations" requirement more narrowly than 
traditional definitions of customary international law to also require that a plaintiff 
demonstrate three factors: (1) that no State condones the act at issue and there is a 
"universal" norm against it, (2) that there are workable criteria to define whether a 
particular act constitutes a prohibited act that violates the norm, and (3) the 
prohibition against the act is consistently applied against :!very actor. 37 There has 
been controversy about each of these factors because scholars have disagreed 
about how many nations must adhere to a practice for it to be universal or 
consistent and what amount of evidence is required.38 Filartiga and subsequent 
courts have also required evidence that the alleged violation is of "mutual, and not 
merely several, concern.,,39 Furthermore, some courts in addition consider whether 
the norm is recognized by the United States.40 
A narrower subset of customary international law is the fundamental jus 
cogens norms that prohibit States from ever committing certain heinous human 
rights violations such as torture, slavery, or war crimes.41 The Ninth Circuit in 
Sarei observed that jus cogens violations "form the least controversial core of 
rule derived from practices states consider legally obligatory); see also Boeving, supra note 
25, at 116 & nn.41-42 (stating that violation is evidenced by state practice and opinio 
juris). 
37 See Flores II, 414 F.3d at 248 ("[I]n determining what offenses violate customary 
international law, courts must proceed with extraordinary care and restraint."); Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. (Beanal J), 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997), ajJ'd, 197 
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Boeving, supra note 25, at 116. 
38 Boeving, supra note 25, at 116 n.41; Hagen & Michaels, supra note 35, at 129-31. 
39 See Flores II, 414 F.3d at 244; Beanal III, 197 F.3d at 167; In re Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Filartiga, 
630 F.2d at 888; Boeving, supra note 25, at 116 n.45. 
40 See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 
502 (9th Cir.1992); Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2002), ajJ'd in part, 
vacated in part, rev'd in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), ajJ'd in part, vacated in part, 
rev'd in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 
2007); Nat'! Coal. Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997); Boeving, supra note 25, at 123. 
41 A jus cogens norm "is a norm accepted and recognized by the international 
community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332; see Hirsh v. Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("A foreign state 
violates jus cogens when it participates in such blatant violations of fundamental human 
rights as 'genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and racial 
discrimination.'" (quoting Comm. of U.S. Citizens in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,941 
(D.C. Cir. 1988))); Denegri v. Chile, Civ. A. No. 86-3085, 1992 WL 91914, at *4 n.7 
(D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1992) ("[J]us cogens comprises the 'fundamental human rights law that 
prohibits genocide, slavery, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and racial 
discrimination. "'); Joshua Gregory Holt, Comment, The International Law Exception to the 
Act of State Doctrine: Redressing Human Rights Abuses in Papua New Guinea, 16 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL'y J. 459, 469 n.61 (2007). 
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modem day ATCA jurisdiction.,,42 Some courts and scholars have argued that 
courts should limit ATS cases to only jus cogens norms.43 Other courts and 
commentators have argued that the A TS' s jurisdiction includes customary 
international law norms that are not jus cogens norms.44 As will be discussed 
below, the Supreme Court in Sosa did not clearly limit ATS claims to jus cogens 
norms, but may have allowed a somewhat broader range of customary international 
law claims.45 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court's Sosa decision, the most controversial issue 
surrounding Filartiga was the extent to which American courts should recognize 
new rights and duties that have developed in international law since 1789.46 Most 
courts followed Filartiga in allowing A TS claims based on contemporary 
customary international law, although there was some disagreement among courts 
regarding which current norms are sufficiently obligatory and universally 
recognized to be cognizable under the A TS. 47 By contrast, rejecting Filartiga's 
evolutionary approach to international law, Judge Bork in his concurring opinion 
in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic argued an "originalist" approach that claims 
under the A TS are limited to those torts that violated the "law of nations" when 
42 Sarei III, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
43 See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 
(arguing that only jus cogens norms are actionable), vacated on other grounds, 403 F.3d 
708 (9th Cir. 2005); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding 
that jus cogens norms are the standard); David D. Christensen, Note, Corporate Liability 
for Overseas Human Rights Abuses: The Alien Tort Statute After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
62 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1219, 1223, 1245-49, 1268-70 (2005) (stating that jus cogens 
should be minimum threshold for ATS actionable norms); Genc Trnavci, The Meaning and 
Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and International 
Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 193, 265-66 (2005) (asserting that jus cog ens is best way 
to provide remedy for human rights violations). 
44 See Sa rei II, 456 F.3d at 1085-86 (allowing UNCLOS to serve as ATS claim even 
though it is not clearly a jus cogens violation); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F. 2d 
699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that ATS claims may be based on customary international 
law norm that is not jus cogens violation); see also William S. Dodge, Which Torts in 
Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 351, 357-58 (2001) 
(same); Hugh King, Sosa V. Alvarez-Machain and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VICT. U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 1,9 (2006) (same); Pamela J. Stephens, A Categorical Approach to 
Human Rights Claims: Jus Cogens as a Limitation on Enforcement?, 22 WIS. INT'L L.J. 
245,265-72 (2004) (same). 
45 See Sosa V. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); Holt, supra note 41, at 
469-70. 
46 See Boeving, supra note 25, at 110-11. 
47 See Kadic V. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (expanding ATS to allow 
claims against private individuals); Jason W. Brant, Case Note, Flores V. Southern Peru 
Copper Corporation: The Second Circuit Closes the Courthouse Door on Environmental 
Claims Brought Under the ATCA, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 131, 134 (2003) 
(arguing that Filartiga rejects the notion that international law was frozen in 1789). 
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Congress enacted the legislation in 1789.48 At that time in history, the ATS would 
have reached only claims of piracy and prize claims involving seizures of ships, 
offenses against ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct.49 
C. United States Treaties 
In addition to actions based on the law of nations, the A TS also clearly 
recognizes actions based on an alleged tort that violates "a treaty of the United 
States. ,,50 Because a number of A TS plaintiffs like those in Sarei have used treaties 
as evidence of the law of nations, A TS suits that are based on a violation of a 
"treaty of the United States" must be distinguished from those alleging a violation 
of the law of nations based in part on evidence from treaties to which the United 
States mayor may not be a party. To qualify as a "treaty of the United States," the 
United States would have to be a party to the relevant treaty and it would have to 
be in force in the United States.51 
Although treaties of the United States are defined in the Supremacy Clause of 
the Constitution as part of the "supreme Law of the Land" along with statutes and 
the Constitution itself,52 treaties do not generally create rights that are privately 
enforceable in courtS.53 Pursuant to the arising under clause 28 U.S.c. § 1331, 
federal courts have jurisdiction over suits based on treaties only if the treaty is self-
executing, meaning treaties that expressly or impliedly create a private cause or 
action. 54 If a treaty is not self-executing, a plaintiff may enforce its provisions only 
48 726 F.2d 774, 798-827 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
49 Boeving, supra note 25, at III n.14 
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Boeving, supra note 25, at 116-17. 
51 See Boeving, supra note 25, at 117. 
52 The Supremacy Clause states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2. 
53 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004); United States v. 
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51,89-90,98 (1833); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 
314 (1829) (holding that a treaty might not "operate of itself'), overruled on other grounds 
by Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 51; Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 
1985) (per curiam) (commenting that usually treaties "do not provide the basis for a private 
lawsuit unless they are intended to be self-executing"); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (Bork, 1., concurring) (stating that treaties on their own force actually deny 
cause of action); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that 
only limited treaties may be relied upon). 
54 See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373; 
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bork, 1., concurring); Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 30 ("It is only when 
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when Congress has enacted legislation that specifically creates a private right of 
action.55 
Whether a treaty or international agreement constitutes domestic United 
States law and is thus enforceable by courts depends on whether it is self-
executing.56 To determine whether a treaty or executive agreement is self-
executing, courts first examine the language of the agreement. If the language is 
uncertain, courts then also examine the circumstances concerning its negotiation, 
the type of obligations that it imposes, and how those obligations would be 
enforced. 57 An agreement is self-executing if the parties to an agreement, including 
the United States, intended that the agreement have binding effect as domestic law 
without Congress or the legislative bodies in other party countries implementing 
additional legislation.58 Similarly, the 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (Restatement (Third)) states that an 
international agreement is non-self-executing "if the agreement manifests an 
intention that it shall not become effective as domestic law without the enactment 
of implementing legislation; if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress 
by resolution, requires implementing legislation, or if implementing legislation is 
constitutionally required.,,59 
Unfortunately, it is not always clear from a treaty's language or legislative 
a treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private rights may be 
detennined, that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights."); Boeving, 
supra note 25, at 117. But see Richard L. Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 VA. l. INT'L L. 545, 553 n.44 (2000) 
(acknowledging that most scholars believe that ATS suits can be based on self-executing 
treaties only, but arguing in favor of ATS suits based on non-self-executing treaties 
because otherwise the treaty provision in the A TS is superfluous because plaintiffs can 
already sue to enforce self-executing treaties under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "arising under" 
jurisdiction). 
55 See lama v. United States LN.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353,362 (D.N.J. 1998). 
56 Virginia A. Melvin, Case Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REv. 211, 219 n.42 (1985) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 141, 147, 154 (1965)). 
57 Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.c. Cir. 1976) ("In detennining whether 
a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the signatory parties as manifested by 
the language of the instrument, and, if the instrument is uncertain, recourse must be had to 
the circumstances surrounding its execution."); Saipan ex reI. Guerrero v. U.S. Dep't of 
Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding that whether an international agreement 
"establishes affinnative and judicially enforceable obligations without implementing 
legislation" depends on "the purposes of the treaty and the objectives of its creators, the 
existence of domestic procedures and institutions appropriate for direct implementation, the 
availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods, and the immediate and 
long-range social consequences of self- or non-self-execution"); Melvin, supra note 56, at 
219 n.42. 
58 Melvin, supra note 56, at 219 n.42. 
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § III 
(4)(a)-(c) (1987). 
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history whether it is self-executing or not.60 The United States has often attached 
reservations, understandings, and declarations to a treaty that seek to limit its 
domestic effect by including a declaration that it is not self-executing.61 In other 
cases, Congress has declared that a treaty is not self-executing and creates no rights 
in federal courtS.62 
D. Private Versus State Actors 
Many treaties apply only to the state parties that signed them and do not apply 
to private actors.63 Some ATS plaintiffs have argued that treaties that apply only to 
state parties such as UNCLOS can be used as evidence of what is customary 
international law and thus can apply indirectly to private defendants. 64 
Additionally, there are some treaties that are applicable to individuals, including 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78), which limits the discharge of certain pollutants from ships.65 
Customary international law clearly reaches the activities of state officials. 
The Filartiga decision, for example, involved the conduct of a former state official 
who committed alleged violations of international law while he was employed by 
60 Compare Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (holding the English 
version of an 1819 treaty with Spain to be non-self-executing), with United States v. 
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833) (holding the Spanish version of the same treaty 
to be self-executing); Guerrero, 502 F.2d at 97 (discussing "contextual" factors affecting 
whether treaty is self-executing); Melvin, supra note 56, at 219 n.42; Andrew M. ScobIe, 
Comment, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Federal Court, 
74 CAL. L. REv. 127, 160 n.194 (1986). 
61 Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts-
Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 807, 823-24 (1998) ("As an example, 
the United States attached to its ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 'the cornerstone of modern international human rights law' five 
reservations, five understandings, and four declarations." (footnotes omitted)). 
62 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) ("Several times, indeed, the 
Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and 
applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the 
document were not self-executing."). 
63 See Flores II, 414 F.3d 233, 258-59 (2d Cir. 2003); Michael Anderson, 
Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer?, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 399, 403 (2002); Boeving, supra note 25, at 137; Peggy Rodgers Kalas, 
International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access by Non-State 
Entities, 12 COLO. 1. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 191, 192 (2001). 
64 See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. 
65 See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, art. 1 (b), 
Nov. 2, 1973,94 Stat. 2302, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61, amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to 
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 16, 1978, 
1340 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78]; DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 791-814 (3d ed. 2007); Boeving, supra note 25, at 137. 
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the State.66 There has been controversy, however, about whether and under what 
circumstances private individuals or corporations may be liable under the ATS.67 
In 1984, Judge Edwards in a solo concurring opinion in Tel-Oren argued that there 
were only a "handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual 
responsibility," including the long prohibited practices of piracy and slave 
trading.68 He argued that there was insufficient consensus at that time that torture 
by private actors violated internationallaw.69 
By contrast, in Kadic v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit held that international 
law prohibited non-state, private individuals from committing a broader range of 
crimes and hence that those individuals were subject to ATS jurisdiction.7o The 
court argued that the A TS should apply to serious violations by private actors: 
We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the 
modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that 
certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken 
by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private 
individuals.7l 
The Second Circuit concluded that private individuals could be liable under 
the A TS for the crimes of piracy, slave trading, genocide, and war crimes.72 On the 
other hand, the court determined that "torture and summary execution-when not 
perpetrated in the course of genocide or war crimes-are proscribed by 
international law only when committed by state officials or under color of law.,,73 
If international law prohibits private individuals from committing certain acts, 
international law generally applies the same prohibitions to corporations.74 In 
66 Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) ("We find that an act of 
torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established 
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations."). 
67 Hagen & Michaels, supra note 35, at 130-3l. 
68 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(Edwards, J., concurring). 
69 Id. at 791-795. Judge Edwards was the only member of the Tel-Oren panel to 
address whether the law of nations applies to non-state actors. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 
232,240 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995). Judge Bork, based on separation of powers principles and the 
original 1789 intent of the statute, concluded that the Alien Tort Statute does not apply to 
modern violations of the law of nations. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798 (Bork, J., concurring). 
Judge Robb concluded that the issue in the case was nonjusticiable. !d. at 823 (Robb, 1., 
concurring). 
70 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. 
71Id. 
72 !d. at 239-43. 
73 !d. at 243. 
74 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (human 
rights abuses); Bowoto v. Chevron, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (human rights 
abuses); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (N.D. Ala. 2003) 
(wrongful death); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 
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Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., the district court 
determined that "a considerable body of United States and international precedent 
indicates that corporations may be liable for violations of international law.,,75 In 
Sosa, the Supreme Court in a footnote stated that the issue was whether "private 
actors," either corporations or private individuals, were liable under the A TS and 
did not differentiate between private individuals and corporations.76 
Another issue is when private individuals or corporations may be vicariously 
liable for conduct that is allegedly undertaken "under the color of state authority" 
of a foreign nation or that allegedly "aids and abets" human rights violations 
committed by foreign governments or paramilitary groups.77 To answer this 
question, federal courts have analogized the domestic color of law jurisprudence of 
42 U.S.c. § 1983 to assess whether a private defendant is a state actor for purposes 
of jurisdiction under the A TS. 78 In Kadic, for example, the Second Circuit 
concluded that international law recognized that private actors acting in close 
concert or cooperation with a State are held to be acting as a State and therefore 
subject to the same standards of conduct as a State.79 In Doe Iv. Unocal Corp., the 
District Court for Central California concluded that "private actors can be state 
actors if they are 'willful participant[s] in joint action with the state or its 
agents.",80 Additionally, the Unocal court determined that an agreement between a 
government and a private party can constitute joint action. 81 The court held that a 
complaint alleging that a corporation was "jointly engaged with the state officials 
in the challenged activity, namely forced labor and other human rights violations in 
furtherance of the pipeline project" was sufficient to plead state action.82 Finally, 
the Ninth Circuit in Sarei III concluded that claims of vicarious liability are still 
viable after Sosa because courts applying the ATS "draw on federal common law, 
and there are well-settled theories of vicarious liability under federal common 
289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (torture); Doe v. Uno cal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (human rights abuses and torture). Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain: "The Door is Still Ajar" for Human Rights Litigation in u.s. Courts, 70 BROOK. 
L. REV. 533, 557-58 (2005). 
75 244 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
76 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
77 Hagen & Michaels, supra note 35, at 130-31; Stephens, supra note 74, at 558-60. 
78 See, e.g., Sarei [, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1160-63 (C.D. Cal. 2002), ajJ'd in part, 
vacated in part, rev'd in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), afJ'd in part, vacated in part, 
rev'd in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 
2007); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; Christensen, supra note 43, at 1255-56 (discussing use of 
§ 1983 "color oflaw" jurisprudence in ATS suits). 
79 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 ("A private individual acts under color of law within the 
meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state 
aid."). 
80 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 
(1980». 
81 [d. 
82 [d. at 891. 
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law.,,83 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have distilled decisions such as Kadic 
and Uno cal to four different tests to determine if a privatI' party is acting in such 
close concert with a sovereign government to be considered a "state actor": (1) the 
public function test;84 (2) the symbiotic relationship test;85 (3) the nexus test;86 and 
(4) the joint action test.87 In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. (Beanal I), the 
Federal District Court for Eastern Louisiana stated that only one of the four tests 
needs be met to treat a private party as a state actor for purposes of an ATS suit. 88 
E. Defenses 
When an ATS claim is based on wholly foreign acts by non-U.S. citizens, the 
defendant must have sufficient contacts with the United States to establish personal 
jurisdiction under the "minimum contacts" test. 89 Furthermore, courts have often 
dismissed these cases on four separate grounds: (1) the forum non conveniens 
(FNC) doctrine, (2) the political question doctrine, (3) the act of state doctrine, and 
(4) the international comity doctrine.9o 
In cases involving wholly foreign actions by non-U.S. citizens, defendants 
usually seek to dismiss the case based on the FNC doctrine, which requires U.S. 
courts to assess whether a foreign court would be an adequate forum to resolve the 
case. Pursuant to the FNC doctrine, courts have the discretion to decline 
jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and the goals of justice would be 
83 Sarei III, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
84 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (applying public function 
test when a private actor performs a function that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative 
of the State"); Christensen, supra note 43, at 1254 n.21O. 
85 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (using symbiotic 
relationship test when the state "has so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence with [the private party] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in 
the challenged activity"); Christensen, supra note 43, at 1254 n.211. 
86 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH 1. NORMAN, CiVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 
78 (2d ed. 2004) (stating nexus test "requires evidence that the state has coerced or 
significantly encouraged the private party to engage in [the relevant] conduct"); 
Christensen, supra note 43, at 1254 n.212. 
87 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating joint action test applies 
when "[a private individual] acts together with state officials or with significant state aid"); 
Christensen, supra note 43, at 1254-55 & n.213. 
88969 F. Supp. 362, 376-79 (E.D. La. 1997), ajJ'd on other grounds, 197 F.3d 161 
(5th Cir. 1999); RoseMary Reed, Rising Seas and Disappearing Islands: Can Island 
Inhabitants Seek Redress Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'y 1. 
399,407 (2002). 
89 Hagen & Michaels, supra note 35, at 131. 
90 See Pauline Abadie, A New Story of David and Goliath: The Alien Tort Claims Act 
Gives Victims of Environmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable Claim Against 
Multinational Corporations, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 745, 768-74 (2004). 
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better served in another forum. 91 A court must consider both the public interest-
including the State's interest, burdens on the court, and conflict of law 
considerations-and the private interest-including the convenience of the parties 
and access to evidence, but may consider differences in substantive law only if 
litigation in another forum would defeat the ends of justice. 92 
Additionally, defendants may seek dismissal based on the political question 
doctrine, the act of state doctrine, or international comity doctrines. As is discussed 
in Part V, the district court and the Ninth Circuit in Sarei extensively discuss these 
three doctrines. Under the political question doctrine, a court considers whether it 
is appropriate for the judiciary to accept a case that may interfere with the 
constitutional or policy prerogatives of the legislative or executive branches, 
including their foreign policy authority.93 The act of state doctrine prohibits an 
American court from adjudicating claims if doing so would require the court to 
invalidate the official acts of a foreign sovereign performed within its territory; 
however, the doctrine is inapplicable if government has committed a jus cogens 
violation or violates a treaty obligation, and perhaps also if there are other clear 
violations of customary internationallaw.94 The international comity doctrine is a 
91 Boeving, supra note 25, at 120 n.68. 
92 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6, 247 (1981); Boeving, 
supra note 25, at 120 n.68; Matthew R. Skolnik, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in 
Alien Tort Claims Act Cases: A Shell of its Former Self After Wiwa, 16 EMORY INT'L L. 
REv. 187,206 (2002). 
93 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court provided six factors to consider in deciding 
whether the political question doctrine applied: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; [(4)] or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; [(5)] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
369 U.S. 186, 217(1962); see Jodie Michalski, The Careless Gatekeeper: Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, and the Expanding Role of u.s. Courts in Enforcing International Norms, 15 
TuL. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 731, 741-42 (2007) (discussing political question doctrine). 
94 See First Nat'l City Bank V. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972) 
(holding that the act of state doctrine generally bars courts from questioning a foreign 
sovereigns' official acts done within its own territory); Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1183 
(C.D. Cal. 2002), ajJ'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 
2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc 
reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); Boeving, supra note 25, at 125 n.116 
(discussing act of state doctrine); Holt, supra note 41, at 470-91 (arguing act of state 
doctrine is inapplicable if foreign nation violates "crystallized international rules of law" or 
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discretionary doctrine under which courts consider whether it is appropriate for an 
American court to litigate issues that are of great concern to a foreign 
government. 95 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS UNDER THE A TS BEFORE SOSA 
Since 1991, district courts and courts of appeals have addressed a number of 
environmental or related claims under the ATS. Most of these suits asserted 
directly or indirectly that developing nations are unable to protect particular ethnic 
groups in their country from the environmental harms of multinational companies 
(MNCs) because the national government is either too weak to regulate the MNC 
or is acting in concert with the MNC.96 The environmental ATS suits seek 
American courts to provide justice that is allegedly unavailable from the 
developing country's courts. 
Some claims in the cases discussed below were for purely environmental 
claims such as harm to land, air, or water. Purely environmental ATS claims have 
sometimes encountered difficulties because of questions about whether there are 
universally recognized norms against such pollution. For example, some courts 
have questioned whether internal environmental harms in one nation can violate 
international law, which is primarily concerned with transboundary harms 
affecting other nations. 97 Courts have rejected environmental claims based on 
vague principles in MEAs such as "sustainable development" because it is not 
clear how much pollution or environmental degradation would be sufficient to 
violate such principles.98 
Because of the difficulties in winning A TS claims based on environmental 
harms alone, a number of cases have alleged that environmental harms constitute 
human rights violations or are intertwined with traditional human rights violations 
such as torture. 99 Courts have generally rejected environmental ATS claims based 
a treaty obligation); Michalski, supra note 93, at 740-41 (discussing act of state doctrine). 
95 The Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot explained the international comity doctrine 
as follows: 
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws. 
59 u.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
96 See Abadie, supra note 90, at 745-46; Boeving, supra note 25, at 112-15; Richard 
L. Herz, Making Development Accountable to Human Rights and Environmental 
Protection, 94 AM. SOC'y OF INT'L LAW PROC. 216, 217 (2000). 
97 See infra notes 102-109,431-439 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 150-159 and accompanying text. 
99 See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 814 (5th Cir. 2004); 
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on broad assertions that there is a fundamental international human right to life or 
to live in a clean and healthy environment because there are no real limits or 
boundaries to such assertions. loo Courts are more likely to accept A TS claims 
based on allegations that MNCs or foreign governments engaged in human rights 
abuses such as using torture to take land from disfavored ethnic groups to 
appropriate natural resources, but those types of claims at bottom are human rights 
cases and not environmental cases even if environmental exploitation was a 
motivating factor leading to the human rights abuses. lol Although plaintiffs have 
never won an environmental challenge under the A TS, some decisions suggest that 
environmental ATS claims can be successful if the plaintiffs assert narrow and 
well-recognized international law principles. 
A. Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp. 
In Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., a court for the first time directly 
addressed an environmental claim under the ATS.102 The plaintiffs sued FMC 
under the ATS for fraudulently transporting hazardous materials that contained far 
more toxicity than the nonhazardous material promised in the contract between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant. 103 The plaintiffs argued that the fraudulent sale 
violated the Restatement (Third) and Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration of Principles, which grants States the "sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.,,104 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the 
environmental claims were insufficient to establish a violation of international 
Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696,702-03 (2d Cir. 2004); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 
248 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2001); Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 
1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Carl Bruch, Is International Environmental Law Really 
"Law"?: An Analysis of Application in Domestic Courts, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 423, 
447-48 n.111 (2006). 
100 See infra notes 150-159,433 and accompanying text. 
101 Boeving, supra note 25, at 117 n.51-52, 129-30, 134-40; Natalie L. Bridgeman, 
Human Rights Litigation Under the ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims, 6 YALE 
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2003). 
102 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
103 /d. at 669-70. The plaintiffs also sued under the Resource Recovery and 
Conservation Act (RCRA), but that topic is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 672-76. 
104 /d. at 671 (citing United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. NCONF.48114/Rev. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 
1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 602(2) (1987); Boeving, supra note 25, at 118-
19. 
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law.105 The court found that Principle 21 in the Stockholm Declaration did not "set 
forth any specific proscriptions, but rather refer[red] only in a general sense to the 
responsibility of nations to insure that activities within their jurisdiction do not 
cause damage to the environment beyond their borders."lo6 The court determined 
that the Restatement possibly reflected American views on environmental law, but 
not "universally recognized principles of internationallaw."lo7 Accordingly, under 
Filartiga, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that 
prohibiting fraudulent shipments of hazardous materials was universally 
recognized in international law. 108 The court granted the defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion to dismiss because the complaint failed to allege a "clear ... violation of 
the law of nations.,,109 Following Amlon Metals, most cases followed the district 
court's conclusion that general principles in a multinational environmental treaty 
or declaration such as the Stockholm Declaration are insufficient to state a cause of 
action under the ATS. 
B. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. 
1. The District Court's Decision 
In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. (Beanal 1), the plaintiff sued Freeport 
under the A TS for torture, cultural genocide of his Amungme tribe, and 
environmental torts allegedly resulting from the defendant's mining activities in 
Tamika, Irian Jaya (within the Republic of Indonesia).llo The environmental 
claims alleged that the defendant's mining practices caused "destruction, pollution, 
alteration, and contamination of natural waterways, as well as surface and ground 
water sources; deforestation; destruction and alteration of physical 
sUIToundings.,,11I The district court dismissed the environmental claim for failing 
to state a claim for an environmental tort in violation of the law of nations because 
the plaintiff failed to articulate how the defendant's alleged pollution violated 
international law. 1I2 The plaintiff had argued that the "allegations support[ed] a 
cause of action based on three international environmental law principles: (1) the 
Polluter Pays Principle; (2) the Precautionary Principle; and (3) the Proximity 
Principle.,,113 Relying on an international environmental law treatise, the court 
concluded that "[t]he three principles relied on by Plaintiff, standing alone, do not 
constitute international torts for which there is universal consensus in the 
105 Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 671. 
106Id. 
107 !d. 
108 Id.; see Reed, supra note 88, at 408. 
109 Amlon Metals, 775 F. Supp. at 671. 
110 969 F. Supp. 362, 366, 369 (E.D. La. 1997), aff'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Boeving, supra note 25, at 120-22; Reed, supra note 88, at 409. 
III Beanal 1,969 F. Supp. at 369. 
112Id. at 382-84. 
113Id. at 383. 
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international community as to their binding status and their content.,,114 
Additionally, the court questioned the appropriateness of using these three 
principles against the defendant because they apply only to States and not to 
corporations such as the defendant. 115 Thus, because the plaintiff had alleged that 
the defendant's actions were "corporate decisions, rather than state practices," the 
plaintiff's allegations failed to establish a claim under either international 
customary law or the Restatement, which both focus solely on "state obligations 
and liability in the area of environmentallaw.,,116 
Additionally, the court suggested that extreme environmental injuries might 
constitute genocide if the defendant specifically intended to cause such destruction. 
In this case, however, the court concluded that the plaintiff's vague allegations that 
the environmental harms constituted "cultural genocide" were insufficient to 
establish a violation of international law because the plaintiff failed to allege that 
the defendant caused the pollution with the purpose of destroying the Amungme 
group. I 17 Despite the court's dismissal of the environmental claims, some 
commentators have interpreted the district court's initial decision to "suggest that 
claims for environmental human rights violations" might be filed under the A TS 
"if pled with sufficient specificity.,,118 
The court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice, but 
allowed the plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint that more specifically 
plead his allegations of genocide and human rights violations. I 19 After the plaintiff 
filed a Second Amended Complaint, the district court granted the defendant's 
motion to strike that complaint and dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff 
had again failed to plead his allegations with sufficient specificity on the issues of 
genocide and state action. 120 The court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to clarify his 
environmental allegations and stated that it had "not invit[ ed] more definite 
allegations as to other issues, including ... environmental tortS.,,121 Finally, "the 
district court granted Freeport's motion to strike Beanal's Third Amended 
Complaint and dismissed his claims with prejudice.,,122 
2. The Court of Appeals' Decision 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss 
the complaint with prejudice. 123 In explaining its position, the Fifth Circuit 
1141d. at 384 (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995)). 
liS Id. 
1161d. 
1171d. at 372-73. 
liS Reed, supra note 88, at 409. 
119 Beanall, 969 F. Supp. at 384. 
120 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. (BeanallI), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12001, at 
*3-4 (E.D. La. Aug. 6 1997). 
121 Id. at *4. 
122 Beanallll, 197 F.3d 161, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1999). 
123/d. at 163-69. 
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appeared to be skeptical of environmental claims under the A TS. The court 
observed that the "sources of international law cited by Beanal and the amici 
merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract 
rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to 
identify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or tortS.,,124 
The court also stated that "federal courts should exercise extreme caution when 
adjudicating environmental claims under international law to insure that 
environmental policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies 
of other governments .... [e]specially when the alleged environmental torts and 
abuses occur within the sovereign's borders and do not affect neighboring 
countries.,,125 
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiff cited the Rio Declaration 
to support his claims of environmental torts and abuses under international law, but 
concluded that Principle 2 of the Declaration was inconsistent with the plaintiff's 
internal pollution claims because it recognized that States have the "sovereign right 
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies.,,126 The court suggested that allegations of transboundary 
pollution potentially violating the Rio Declaration might be actionable under the 
ATS, but observed that "Beanal does not allege in his pleadings that Freeport's 
mining activities in Indonesia have affected environmental conditions in other 
countries.,,127 The tone of the Fifth Circuit's opinion was arguably less receptive to 
future environmental claims under the A TS than the district court's decision, but 
even the Fifth Circuit did not close the door to trans boundary pollution claims. 
C. lota v. Texaco, Inc. and Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 
1. The District Court's Decisions 
In Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda 1), the plaintiffs sued a multinational oil 
corporation, Texaco, for significant environmental harms. 128 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the defendant had intentionally released hazardous wastes into the 
environment, damaged pristine rainforests, and harmed indigenous peoples living 
in the rain forest and their properties. 129 The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of 
over 30,000 Ecuadorians whose environment was damaged by the oil company's 
124Id. at 167. 
125Id. 
126Id. at 167 n.6 (quoting United Nations Conference on Environmental and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, princ. 2, Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. NCONF.151/5/Rev. I, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 
874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration]. 
127 Beanal III, at 167 n.6; see Abadie, supra note 90, at 787. 
128 No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. II, 
1994), reconsidered by 850 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
129Id. at * 1-2. 
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practices in Ecuador.130 
In a preliminary decision in 1994, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in an opinion by Judge Broderick adopted a broad view of 
States' responsibility for preventing environmental damage. 
Although many authorities are relevant, perhaps the most pertinent in the 
present case is the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992). 
Principle 2 on the first page of the document recognizes that States have "the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies," but also have "the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction. 131 
Judge Broderick suggested that Principle 2 may constitute customary 
international law when he stated, "[t]he Rio Declaration may be declaratory of 
what it treated as pre-existing principles just as was the Declaration of 
Independence." 132 
To support their claim that the defendant violated Principle 2, the plaintiffs 
suggested that the alleged pollution impacted the rainforest in the region, in 
addition to their primary claims of damage by the defendant within Ecuador. 133 In 
response to this suggestion, Judge Broderick observed that the"[p]laintiffs mayor 
may not be able to establish international recognition of the worldwide impact 
from effects on tropical rain forests as a result of any conduct alleged in their 
papers which may have been initiated in the United States.,,134 Judge Broderick's 
willingness to consider the broad principles against transboundary pollution in 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration as potentially binding customary international 
law is at odds with the Amlon Metals decision's conclusion that identical language 
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration was too vague to be enforceable 
under the A TS. 135 
Acknowledging that the United States adhered to international commitments 
to control hazardous wastes, Judge Broderick suggested that the plaintiff should be 
permitted to challenge the defendant's actions with a claim under the ATS so long 
as "there were established misuse of hazardous waste of sufficient magnitude to 
amount to a violation of internationallaw.,,136 Citing Amlon Metals, he cautioned, 
however, that "[n]ot all conduct which may be harmful to the environment, and not 
130 Id. at *2. 
131Id. at *22 (quoting Rio Declaration, supra note 126, princ. 2). 
132Id. 
133 Id. at * 1-2. 
134/d. at *22-23. 
135 Compare id. at *22-23 (suggesting that Principle 2 in Rio Declaration may create 
customary international law prohibition against transboundary pollution), with Amlon 
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see supra Part lILA. 
136 Aguinda I, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *24. 
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all violations of environmental laws, constitute violations of the law of nations.,,'37 
He also had reservations about interfering with the decisions of other nations. 138 
Responding to motions by Texaco and the Ecuadorian government to dismiss the 
case because it should be resolved in Ecuador's courts, Judge Broderick delayed 
deciding the case on the merits and instead sought to determine if Ecuador's courts 
would accept the case. 139 Judge Broderick died before he had an opportunity to 
decide the case. 
After Judge Broderick's death, the District Court in Aguinda II, in a decision 
by Judge Rakoff, dismissed the Aguinda action on three separate grounds: (1) the 
FNC doctrine; (2) the international comity doctrine; and (3) the plaintiffs' failure 
to join two indispensable parties-the Republic of Ecuador and its state-owned oil 
company, Petroecuador, which were exempt from suit under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act. 140 In light of these three grounds, Judge Rakoff concluded that 
Ecuador's courts were a more appropriate forum for deciding a case in which 
almost all the alleged harms took place in Ecuador.'41 In dismissing the case, Judge 
Rakoffasserted in dicta that "[i]n short, plaintiffs' imaginative view of this Court's 
power must face the reality that United States district courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction. While their power within those limits is substantial, it does not include 
a general writ to right the world's wrongs.,,142 
2. The Court of Appeals' Decision and Remand 
After consolidating Aguinda with another case, the Second Circuit in Jota v. 
Texaco reversed and remanded the dismissal in Aguinda because Judge Rakoff had 
erred in granting the dismissals absent an agreement by appellee Texaco to submit 
to the jurisdiction of the courts in Ecuador. '43 After defendant Texaco agreed to 
accept Ecuador's jurisdiction, on remand, the district court in Aguinda III granted 
defendant Texaco's motion to dismiss on the grounds of the FNC doctrine because 
"these cases have everything to do with Ecuador and nothing to do with the United 
States."I44 Citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Beanal III and the Amlon Metals 
137Id. 
138Id. at *24-25. 
139Id. at *10,28-32. 
140 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda II), 945 F. Supp. 625, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(citing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.c. §§ 1603(b), 1604 (2006», vacated by 
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), affd, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 
470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
141 Id. at 628. 
142Id. 
143 Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155, 159 (2d CiT. 1998) (consolidating two 
separate prior actions: Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4718 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) and Ashanga v. Texaco Inc., No. 94 Civ. 9266 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1997»; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 119 n.65. 
144 Aguinda v. Texaco (Aguinda III), 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 
303 F.3d 470 (2d CiT. 2002). 
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decision, Judge Rakoff concluded that "the specific claim plaintiffs purport to 
bring under the ATCA-that the Consortium's oil extraction activities violated 
evolving environmental norms of customary international law . . . lacks any 
meaningful precedential support and appears extremely unlikely to survive a 
motion to dismiss.,,145 He quoted with approval the Fifth Circuit's statement that 
federal courts should avoid imposing American environmental policies on foreign 
governments. 146 The Second Circuit later affirmed the decision to dismiss the case 
on grounds of the FNC doctrine. 147 
The Aguinda and Jota decisions demonstrate the importance of the FNC 
doctrine in determining whether U.S. courts will take jurisdiction over an ATS 
case. Additionally, Judge Broderick and Judge Rakoff appeared to have 
philosophical differences in their attitudes toward environmental claims under the 
A TS. Judge Broderick appeared willing to consider broad principles in the Rio 
Declaration as the basis for the law of nations, although he did not make a final 
decision and cautioned that not all environmental harms rise to the level of 
violations of the law of nations. 148 Judge Rakoff was far more skeptical of 
adjudicating environmental claims under international law for fear that U.S. courts 
would try to impose U.S. approaches to environmental issues on other countries. 149 
D. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, Corp 
1. The District Court's Decision 
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper, Corp. (Flores I), Peruvian residents 
brought an ATS claim alleging that air pollution from defendant's copper mining, 
refining, and smelting operations caused serious or fatal lung disease to them and 
their decedents in violation of their "right to life," "right to health," and right to 
"sustainable development" as recognized in international law. 15o The plaintiffs 
argued these rights are recognized as customary international law in several widely 
adopted international agreements including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. 151 The U.S. District Court 
145 Id. at 552. 
146 Id. at 552-53 ('''Federal courts should exercise extreme caution when adjudicating 
environmental claims under international law to insure that environmental policies of the 
United States do not displace environmental policies of other governments.'" (quoting 
Beanal III, 197 F.3d 161,167 (5th Cir. 1999))). 
147 Aguinda v. Texaco (Aguinda IV), 303 F.3d 470,477-80 (2d Cir. 2002). 
148 See supra notes 131-139 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text. 
150 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), afJ'd, 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003); see 
Boeving, supra note 25, at 126-28. 
151 Flores I, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 519-20; see generally International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter ICESCR]. "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
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for the Southern District of New York concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate that these three rights were universally recognized because the Rio 
Declaration also recognized that nations have a sovereign right to exploit their 
resources and the Restatement (Third) generally recognized that each sovereign 
nation was responsible for controlling pollution within its borders. 152 The court 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that there was an international law principle 
prohibiting "egregious" amounts of pollution, even if nations had sovereign 
responsibility for lesser levels of pollution, because it could find no support for 
that distinction in international law. 153 The court granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim 
under the A TS because the plaintiffs had not "demonstrated that high levels of 
environmental pollution within a nation's borders, causing harm to human life, 
health, and development, violate 'well-established, universally recognized norms 
of international law. ",154 The district court also dismissed the case under the FNC 
doctrine because it found that Peru was an adequate alternative forum. 155 
2. The Court of Appeals' Decision 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the 
plaintiffs had failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction or to state a claim under 
the ATS.156 Judge Cabranes, writing for the court of appeals, concluded that the 
alleged rights to life, health, and sustainable development asserted by the plaintiffs 
were too "boundless and indeterminate" to establish binding customary 
international law recognizable under the ATS.157 He rejected the plaintiffs' 
proposed "'shockingly egregious' standard for distinguishing torts that violate 
customary international law from those that merely violate domestic law" because 
there was no evidence that customary international law recognized such a 
distinction: 58 Additionally, Judge Cabranes rejected the plaintiffs' claim alleging 
that "egregious" intra-national pollution from the mining activities violated 
customary international environmental law because intra-national pollution, even if 
severe, is generally a concern of that particular nation alone and not a "mutual 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health." Jd. art. 12; see Rio Declaration, supra note 131, princ. 1 ("Human beings are ... 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature."); Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Istplen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.pdf [hereinafter 
Universal Declaration] ("Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family .... "). 
152 Flores J, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 520-22. 
153 Jd. at 522-24. 
154 Jd. at 525 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
155 Jd. at 531-41. 
156 Flores II, 414 F.3d 233,266 (2d Cir. 2003). 
157 Jd. at 255. 
158 Jd. at 252-54. 
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concern" of the international community at large. 159 Since it held that the plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim under the A TS, the Second Circuit did not address the 
district court's dismissal under the FNC doctrine. 160 
E. Environmental Decisions Before So sa 
Before the district court's 2002 decision in Sarei I, lower courts generally 
concluded that environmental claims failed to meet the specific or definable and 
universal and obligatory test used by Filartiga and many subsequent ATS 
decisions. 161 Lower courts have viewed environmental claims as less serious, 
specific, obligatory, or universally recognized than the widely accepted jus cogens 
nonns prohibiting torture, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, forced 
labor, and slavery.162 Additionally, lower courts possibly may be more willing to 
dismiss environmental cases on discretionary grounds-such as FNC, international 
comity, the political question doctrine, or the act of state doctrine-and less likely 
to dismiss human rights cases. 163 The four cases above have suggested that ATS 
plaintiffs asserting environmental claims must either more carefully demonstrate 
that the defendant's activities violate specific provisions of widely accepted 
environmental agreements or that their actions are intertwined with serious human 
rights abuses such as torture or forced labor that courts have accepted as the 
appropriate basis for ATS suitS. I64 
In the four environmental cases discussed in this Section, federal courts 
generally took a relatively narrow view of the types of environmental claims that 
are cognizable under the ATS. None of the plaintiffs in these cases won a purely 
environmental claim under the ATS. Based on the Second Circuit's Flores II 
decision, the Fifth Circuit's Beanal III decision, the district court decision in 
Amlon Metals, and Judge Rakoff's dicta in Aguinda II, courts are generally 
reluctant to treat broad principles or declarations in multinational environmental 
agreements as enforceable under the ATS. In Amlon Metals, the district court 
rejected the plaintiffs claims based on Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration because the Declaration did not "set forth any specific proscriptions, 
but rather refer[red] only in a general sense to the responsibility of nations to 
insure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the 
159 !d. at 253-55 & n.28, 266. 
160Id. at 266. 
161 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(suggesting the ATS applies to "a handful of heinous actions--each of which violates 
definable, universal, and obligatory norms"); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human 
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international 
law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory."); Boeving, supra note 25, 
at 129, 133; Stephens, supra note 74, at 553. 
162 See Stephens, supra note 74, at 553. 
163 See Boeving, supra note 25, at 128-29. 
164 See Boeving, supra note 25, at 129-30. 
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environment beyond their borders.,,165 Similarly, in Flores II the Second Circuit 
stated that the plaintiffs' claims to a "right to life," "right to health," and right to 
"sustainable development" under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development plaintiffs were "boundless and 
indeterminate ... , expressing virtuous goals understandably expressed at a level 
of abstraction needed to secure the adherence of States that disagree on many of 
the particulars regarding how actually to achieve them.,,166 Likewise, in Beanal III, 
the Fifth Circuit asserted: 
The sources of international law cited by Beanal and the amici [which 
included the polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle and the 
proximity principle] merely refer to a general sense of environmental 
responsibility and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or 
discernable standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute 
international environmental abuses or torts. 167 
Courts also emphasized that it was inappropriate to use A TS suits as a means 
to impose American environmental law or standards on foreign nations. The Fifth 
Circuit in Beanal III stated that "federal courts should exercise extreme caution 
when adjudicating environmental claims under international law to insure that 
environmental policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies 
of other governments ... especially when the alleged environmental torts and 
abuses occur within the sovereign's borders and do not affect neighboring 
countries.,,168 Judge Rakoff quoted that statement with approval in his opinion. 169 
Judge Broderick's initial decision in Aguinda I suggested that an 
environmental plaintiff could establish a cognizable A TS claim based on Principle 
2 of the Rio Declaration, although he limited the scope of that principle to 
preventing serious transboundary harms to other nations, which is a principle that 
has broad international acceptance. 170 This portion of his opinion appears to be at 
odds with Amlon Metals, which rejected considering transboundary harms under 
identical language in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. 17I Furthermore, 
he recognized not all harmful environmental conduct violates the law of nations 
and that American courts should hesitate to interfere with the decisions of other 
nations.172 Because of his death, Judge Broderick never issued a final decision so it 
165 Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp. 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
166 Flores II, 414 F.3d 233, 255 (2d Cir. 2003). 
167 Beanal III, 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999). 
168Id. 
169 Aguinda III, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), afJ'd, 303 F.3d 470 
(2d Cir. 2002). 
170 See Aguinda J, No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *22 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994). 
171 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
172 Aguinda J, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718 at *24-25. 
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is impossible to know whether he would have accepted any of the plaintiffs' claims 
as valid under the ATS. 
In Beanal I, the district court suggested that the plaintiff might establish a 
valid A TS claim for genocide if he could show that the defendant specifically 
intended to cause extreme environmental destruction, but concluded that the 
plaintiffs vague allegations that the environmental harms constituted "cultural 
genocide" were insufficient. 173 Further, the district court in Beanall dismissed the 
plaintiffs' purely environmental allegations based on the polluter pays principle, 
the precautionary principle and the proximity principle because these principles 
were not universally recognized "in the international community as to their binding 
status and their content.,,174 The Beanal I district court's greater Willingness to 
consider genocide claims than purely environmental claims suggests that some 
courts may be more willing to consider A TS claims based on recognized human 
rights abuses that are a proxy for environmental harms. 175 
In Flores II, Judge Cabranes rejected an A TS claim based on pollution in one 
nation because such internal pollution did not raise a "mutual concern" of the 
international community.176 Although Flores II did not address transboundary 
pollution because the plaintiffs did not allege that any of the pollution had an effect 
outside of Peru,177 Judge Cabranes' s "mutual concern" analysis implies that 
regulation of trans boundary pollution is a concern of the international community 
and, therefore, that treaties or custom addressing such pollution are more likely to 
constitute customary international law than intra-national pollution. Similarly, the 
Fifth Circuit in Beanal III did not close the door to transboundary pollution 
claims. 178 Even in the case of transboundary pollution, however, courts would have 
to address whether international declarations such as the Rio Declaration that 
contain general prohibitions against serious transboundary pollution provide 
specific enforceable standards that could be enforced under the ATS. 
Additionally, as Judge Rakoffs Aguinda III opinion demonstrates, even if a 
173 Beanall, 969 F. Supp. 362,372-73 (E.D. La. 1997), affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
1741d. at 383-84 (citing PHILLIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I: FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS AND IMPLEMENTATION 183 (Vaughan 
Lowe & Dominic McGoldrick eds., 1995). 
175 Boeving, supra note 25, at 117 n.51-52, 129-30, 134-40; see Bridgeman, supra 
note 101, at 2-3 ("Depending on how the remedies are crafted, however, the ATCA may be 
used as a successful proxy for ... environmental claims where human rights abuses and 
environmental wrongs overlap."). 
176 Flores 1I, 414 F.3d 233,247-66 (2d Cir. 2003). 
1771d. at 255 n.29 ("Because plaintiffs do not allege that defendant's conduct had an 
effect outside the borders of Peru, we need not consider the customary international law 
status oftransnational pollution."). 
178 See Beanallll, 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding only "that Beanal failed 
to show in his pleadings that Freeport's mining activities constitute environmental torts or 
abuses under international law" not that no such cause of action exists); see also Abadie, 
supra note 90, at 787 (discussing the Beanal court's willingness to consider a case that 
alleges transboundary damages). 
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plaintiff can establish a cognizable environmental human rights claim under the 
A TS, there is a significant possibility that a court will dismiss the case pursuant to 
the FNC doctrine if a foreign court in the nation that the violations occurred is 
capable of hearing the case. The district court in Flores I also invoked the FNC 
doctrine, although the Second Circuit did not address that ground for dismissal on 
appeal. 179 Judge Rakoff in his initial Aguinda II also used the international comity 
doctrine as a ground for dismissal, but he did not rely on that doctrine in his final 
decision. 180 
IV. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN 
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court in Sosa held that courts may allow 
A TS suits based on modem customary international law norms, but only if those 
norms are comparable to the international law norms that were the grounds for 
ATS suits in 1789. 181 In 1990, a United States grand jury indicted Mexican 
national Humberto Alvarez-Machain for the torture and murder of a Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent in Mexico. 182 Mexico refused to extradite 
Alvarez-Machain to the United States. 183 Mexican nationals hired by the DEA 
abducted Alvarez-Machain, briefly detained him overnight in a motel and brought 
him in a private plane to the United States where federal officers arrested him. 184 
After being tried and acquitted, Alvarez-Machain returned to Mexico and filed suit 
under the ATS against Sosa, a Mexican citizen involved in the abduction. 185 In an 
en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff could sue under the A TS 
because there is a "clear and universally recognized norm" prohibiting arbitrary 
arrest and detention. 186 
A. The Majority Opinion: Opening the Door to ATS Claims, But How Far? 
The Sosa Court adopted a relatively narrow interpretation of which modem 
norms of international law may serve as the basis of an ATS suit, but the Court 
179 See supra notes 150-159 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra notes 140-142, 144-146 and accompanying text. 
181 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731-32 (2004) ("[W]e are persuaded that 
federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations 
of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized 
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."). 
182 !d. at 697. 
183Id. at 698. 
184 Id. 
185 !d. He also sued under Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USCS §§ 1346(b)(l), 2671-80 
(2006), against several DEA agents and the u.s. government. Id. 
186 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604,620 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane), 
rev'd, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The court also allowed him to sue 
DEA agents under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but that issue is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Id. at 640. 
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refused to adopt the "originalist" position that the statute is limited to only those 
norms that existed in 1789.187 The Court unanimously agreed that the ATS's text 
"is in terms only jurisdictional" and does not specifically authorize any causes of 
action. 188 Additionally, all members of the Court agreed that courts had historically 
interpreted the ATS's jurisdiction to include common-law causes of action based 
on the small number of international law violations with a potential for personal 
liability that existed in 1789, such as offenses against ambassadors, violations of 
safe conduct, and possibly claims of piracy and prize claims involving seizures of 
ships.189 
The Sosa majority acknowledged that there were five reasons why federal 
courts should be reluctant to allow A TS suits to address modem international law 
norms, but the majority did not find any of these reasons compelling enough to 
prohibit all suits based on modem international law. 190 First, Justice Souter 
observed that courts need to be more cautious about recognizing modem rights as 
enforceable under the A TS because modem courts have a far broader view of their 
discretion to create new rights through the common law than courts in 1789, when 
judges may have believed that they were simply discovering rights inherent in the 
common law. 191 Second, since its 1938 decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,192 the Court has limited the authority of federal courts to make common 
law without congressional guidance. 193 Third, because the decision to create a 
private cause of action should usually be left to Congress, courts should be 
reluctant to establish a judicially based private cause of action. 194 Fourth, reflecting 
the concerns embodied in the act of state doctrine, the Court stated that courts 
should be concerned about the impact of suits on our foreign relations and 
therefore should be cautious about accepting A TS claims that seek "a limit on the 
power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign 
government or its agent has transgressed those limits.,,195 Fifth, Congress had not 
explicitly authorized the Court to recognize new causes of action based on the 
evolution of international law. 196 The majority conceded that these five reasons 
"argue for great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights," but they 
disagreed with Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion that the Court should refuse to 
187 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729-31 (2004); see Boeving, supra note 
25, at l31 (considering the spectrum of possible decision-making grounds, and concluding 
that the court "sought a middle ground" between originialism and jurisdictional expansion). 
188 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added); see Boeving, supra note 25, at 131. 
189 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 741, 745-48, 755; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 131-32. 
190 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-3l. 
191 Id. at 725-26. 
192 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
193 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726. 
194Id. at 727. 
195Id. at 727; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 135 (elaborating on potential causes of 
action that are likely foreclosed by this concern). 
196 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728. 
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recognize any new causes of action under the ATS.197 
Because federal courts had considered evolving international law norms for 
the last two centuries, Justice Souter's majority opinion concluded "that the door is 
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of 
international norms today.,,198 The Court's reference to "vigilant doorkeeping" and 
its admonition that A TS suits should be limited "to a narrow class of international 
norms today" suggests that the Court wanted lower courts to recognize only a 
limited set of modem international law norms as suitable for ATS suitS. 199 The 
Court next established a relatively narrow standard for A TS suits based on modem 
norms. Because there were only a few narrow and specific international law norms 
in 1789 when Congress enacted the ATS, the Court determined that "there are 
good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should 
exercise in considering a new cause of action" under the ATS.200 The Court 
concluded, "[a]ccordingly, we think courts should require any claim based on the 
present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by 
the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
eighteenth-century paradigms we have recognized.,,201 
In setting a standard for Alvarez-Machain's case and presumably future cases, 
the Court looked to "historical antecedents.,,202 Without specifying "the ultimate 
criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction" under the A TS, the 
Court stated that "we are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with 
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical 
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.,,203 The Court cited an 1820 case 
involving piracy as the sole example, United States v. Smith?04 In Smith, Justice 
Story addressed both whether piracy was widely prohibited by the international 
community and "whether the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with 
197/d. at 728-30. 
198 Id. at 729. 
199 See Nelson P. Miller et ai., Federal Courts EnforCing Customary International 
Law: The Salutary Effect of So sa v. Alvarez Machain on the Institutional Legitimacy of the 
Judiciary, 3 REGENT 1. INT'L L. 1, 23-25 (2005) (discussing the minimal amount of 
discretion created for lower courts, absent some kind of congressional action). 
200 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
201 Id. at 725; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 131-32 (elaborating on ramifications of 
this concern); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy 
Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 111, 121 
(2004). 
202 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-32; see Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 121 (arguing that 
the Court's standard requires reference to what was "contemplated by the First Congress"). 
203 Sosa, 542 U.S at 732. 
204 I d. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163-80 (1820) as 
"illustrating the specificity with which the law of nations defined piracy"); see 
Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 132 ("Piracy was ... the paradigmatic offense against the 
law of nations .... "). 
HeinOnline -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 1115 2007
2007] U SING ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES To SUE UNDER THE A TS 1115 
reasonable certainty.,,205 He concluded, "there is scarcely a writer on the law of 
nations, who does not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determinate 
nature ... all writers concur, in holding, that robbery ... upon the sea, animo 
furandi, is piracy.,,206 
Some commentators have argued that Sosa's standard is vague and provides 
little guidance to lower COurtS,207 but its historically based, widely accepted, and 
definite-content prongs do have some value in limiting the potential number of 
modem law norms that can serve as the basis for ATS suits.208 Even several critics 
who argue that the Court's standard is vague acknowledge that the Court at least in 
dicta suggested a relatively restrictive approach that would significantly limit 
future A TS suits?09 Because there are far more international agreements, customs, 
205 Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160; see Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 140 
(discussing factors used by federal courts to determine whether the law of nations 
possesses certainty). 
206 Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161; see Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 140-41 
(discussing Smith); Christensen, supra note 43, at 1244--45 (same). A pirate acted without 
sovereign authorization; by contrast, international law did not treat as a criminal a lawful 
privateer acting under sovereign authorization such as letters of marque and reprisal. 
Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 141-42, 145-46, 148-49. 
207 See Benjamin Berkowitz, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: United States Courts as 
Forums for Human Rights Cases and the New Incorporation Debate, 40 HARV. C.R.-c.L. 
L. REv. 289, 290 (2005) (arguing that Sosa is unclear in explaining when courts should 
recognize customary international law claims); Christensen, supra note 43, at 1243-45; 
Brad R. Roth, International Decision: Scope of Alien Tort Statute-Arbitrary Arrest and 
Detention as Violations of Custom, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 804 (David D. Caron ed. 2004) 
("[T]he Sosa decision announces the existence of strict limits to the power of courts to 
establish international law-based causes of action under the A TS, but does relatively little, 
in practical terms, to specify those limits."); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Leading 
Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 446, 454 (2004) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (arguing that both 
of the Sosa's historical standards are vague and provide little guidance for lower courts). 
208 See Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 113 ("While Sosa may at first glance seem 
open-ended (or in the words of the dissent, 'hardly ... a recipe for restraint in future 
cases') the inquiry that it demands is far more restrictive than may initially appear. Sosa 
contains the outlines of a rather demanding test to determine whether a particular 
international law claim can be subject to jurisdiction under the ATS."); Miller et aI., supra 
note 199, at 21 ("[I]f would-be activist courts are willing to be bound by the spirit of the 
Sosa opinion, then the fears of Justice Scalia's Sosa concurrence may be assuaged. While 
the Sosa majority did not get it all right, and while it may have left the door ajar too far, it 
certainly pushed the door a long way in the right direction."). 
209 See Berkowitz, supra note 207, at 290 ("[T]he Court's cautious dicta regarding the 
recognition of new causes of action, may chill judicial incorporation of human rights 
norms."); Christensen, supra note 43, at 1222 ("In addition to its transhistorical test, the 
Court admonished lower courts to exercise caution in granting new causes of action under 
the ATS."); Roth, supra note 207, at 803 ("The Sosa decision seems to have been 
calculated to bring a sharp halt to the expansion of the scope of A TS-enabled claims."); 
Leading Cases, supra note 207, at 451 ("The Sosa majority emphasized restraint in its 
assertion of A TS jurisdiction over claims arising from norms that have developed in 
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and norms today than there were in 1789, the acceptance prong of the test could be 
met by many widely accepted international agreements, declarations, or customs. 
The definite-content requirement is more likely to be a meaningful limitation on 
A TS claims because many international agreements use broad or vague language 
to avoid disagreements among potential signatories. In Sosa, the plaintiffs claim 
failed under the definite content criterion.2lO 
Based on the lower court cases it cited, the Sosa decision may suggest that the 
Court intended to recognize only a narrow range of heinous human rights offenses 
as enforceable under the ATS. Citing with approval Filartiga and two other 
decisions, the Court contended that its test of modem A TS norms-those norms 
widely accepted and clearly defined as norms accepted in 1789-"is generally 
consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue 
before it reached this COurt.,,21l It is important to examine the language that the 
Court quoted in each of these three cases. The Court quoted the following language 
in Filartiga: "for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the 
pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all 
mankind.,,212 This quotation from Filartiga may imply that the Court only intended 
to allow A TS suits to enforce norms such as torture or war crimes that the 
international community finds as repulsive as piracy in 1789.213 Similarly, the 
majority cited with approval Judge Edwards's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren in 
which he suggested that the "limits of section 1350's reach" are defined by "a 
handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal and 
obligatory norms.,,214 These two opinions suggest a very narrow range of 
"heinous" modem international law norms would be recognized in A TS suits, 
perhaps only jus cogens norms. 
The third opinion the majority cited with approval, however, used the broader 
formula that the Ninth Circuit below had used to justify Alvarez-Machain's ATS 
customary international law since 1789."). 
210 Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 121. 
211 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
212 Id. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,890 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
213 A number of commentators have analogized the heinousness of piracy to modem 
human rights offenses. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International 
Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 794 (1988) (arguing that the rationale for universal jurisdiction 
over piracy was that the "fundamental nature" of the offense consisted of "particularly 
heinous and wicked acts"); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of 
Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 80-81 
(200 I) ("Many of the crimes subject to the universality principle are so heinous in scope 
and degree that ... any state may, as humanity's agent, punish the offender .... Piracy's 
fundamental nature and consequences explained why it was subject to universal 
jurisdiction. Piracy often consists of heinous acts of violence or depredation .... "). But see 
Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 136-38 (arguing piracy "was not even regarded as 
particularly heinous, at least not in the way that modem human rights offenses are"). 
214 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
781 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
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claim.215 The majority cited with approval the Ninth Circuit's statement in In re 
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation that "[a]ctionable violations 
of international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and 
obligatory.,,216 Although Marcos itself involved allegations of serious human rights 
abuses including torture, summary execution, and disappearance,217 Justice Scalia 
in his concurring opinion argued that the Ninth Circuit's test can be used by lower 
courts to recognize a very broad range of international law norms, including ones 
that the majority would likely reject such as the Ninth Circuit's opinion below that 
the majority had reversed.218 Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Sosa did not 
clearly limit ATS claims to jus cogens norms, but may have allowed a somewhat 
broader range of customary international law claims.219 
The Court closed its discussion of how lower courts should apply its standard 
for modem norms of international law with the observation that when courts 
decide which causes of action meet this standard they must exercise "judgment 
about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the 
federal courtS.,,220 The Court implied that lower courts should be cautious in 
recognizing A TS claims. Yet because the Court failed to provide a clear rule, it is 
likely that lower court judges will disagree about when allowing an A TS suit will 
have negative consequences on the judiciary, other branches of government, U.S. 
foreign policy, or foreign nations. In a footnote, the Sosa Court observed that other 
doctrines might further limit the availability of A TS suits, but it did not decide 
whether and when those doctrines might apply.221 The Court stated that it would 
consider in "an appropriate case" the European Commission's argument as amicus 
curiae that international law required ATS plaintiffs to first exhaust any remedies 
available in the country where the alleged harms took place and "perhaps in other 
forums such as international claims tribunals.,,222 
Additionally, the Court observed that in a future ATS case it might need to 
address how much deference courts should give to the political branches if either 
the executive or legislative branch objected to certain litigation.223 As an example, 
the court discussed several class action suits pending in federal district courts in 
which plaintiffs sought damages from corporations that allegedly participated in or 
abetted the former South African government's systematic laws of racial 
215 Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(finding the norm against arbitrary arrest and detention in this case to be "universal, 
obligatory, and specific"), rev'd, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
216 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing with approval In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 
Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
217 In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d at 1469. 
218 See infra notes 236-252 and accompanying text. 
219 See Holt, supra note 41, at 469-70. 
220 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33. 
221 !d. at 733 n.21. 
222Id. 
223 !d. 
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discrimination called "apartheid.,,224 The current South African government has 
objected to these suits as contrary to its promotion of racial healing and 
forgiveness through its Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the United 
States has agreed that these suits are harrnful.225 The Court concluded that "[i]n 
such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious 
weight to the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy.,,226 
The Sosa decision's "serious weight" standard for considering the objections 
of the executive or legislative branches provides limited guidance to lower courts 
in deciding how to balance the interests of litigants against those of the political 
branches. The one case cited by the court as an example of courts giving serious 
weight to the political branches was a sovereign immunity case where courts 
traditionally gave deference to the opinions of the executive branch.227 The United 
States' support of the democratically elected South African government's 
objection to litigation that undermines its carefully negotiated process for national 
reconciliation is a relatively easy case for judicial deference.228 In other cases 
where the United States has objected to ATS litigation because of the potential 
impact on business investments or foreign relations, plaintiffs have countered with 
submissions that challenge the factual assumptions of the executive branch's 
objections.229 In applying other jurisdictional doctrines the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have recognized that courts should not automatically defer to 
executive branch submissions urging the dismissal of a case, but must exercise 
independent judgrnent?30 In contrast, the Sosa Court's serious weight language 
suggests substantial deference to executive submissions, but it does not imply 




227 See id. (comparing Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688-91 (2004); Stephens, 
supra note 74, at 561-62. 
228 Stephens, supra note 74, at 562. 
229 See id. 
230 See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (giving deference to executive 
branch's views, but carefully reviewing the evidence submitted by the government); First 
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 772-73 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (rejecting unquestioning deference by judiciary to executive branch 
submissions); id. at 773-96 (Powell, J., concurring) (same); id. at 778-80 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (same); Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 840 F.2d 26,36-37 (D. C. 
CiT. 1988) ("[W]hatever weight the opinion of the [State] Department, as a presumed 
expert in the foreign relations field, is able to garner, deference cannot extend to blatant 
disregard of countervailing evidence."), vacated on other grounds, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the Use of State 
Department "Statements of Interest" in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of 
Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 807, 818-20 (2006) (arguing separation 
of powers doctrine requires judiciary to examine whether executive branch submission 
urging dismissal of case is appropriate); Stephens, supra note 74, at 562-64 (same). 
231 Baxter, supra note 230, at 821-22. 
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the serious weight standard in the Sarei case is not easy because the plaintiffs 
raised important questions about the assumptions in the statement of interest (SOl). 
Additionally, changing circumstances since the case was filed may raise doubts 
about its continuing validity. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the 
plaintiff could not sue under the A TS because no norm of customary international 
law prohibited his single illegal detention for less than one day that ended when he 
was transferred to lawful authorities in the United States.232 The Court concluded 
that Alvarez-Machain's claim did not meet the Court's standard for international 
norms comparable to those recognized in 1789 because there is no clear and 
universally recognized norm of international law prohibiting arbitrary arrest and a 
brief detention lasting less than one day.233 The Court observed that a prolonged 
arbitrary detention might violate customary international law, but it did not decide 
that question?34 
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion 
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that federal 
courts no longer had the authority to incorporate new norms of international law 
into the A TS. 235 Justice Scalia argued that after the Court's 1938 Erie decision,236 
federal courts no longer have common-law-making authority and hence cannot 
adopt new norms of evolving international law.237 Furthermore, Justice Scalia 
disagreed with allowing federal courts to selectively incorporate new norms into 
the ATS because, in his view, "the judicial lawmaking role it invites would commit 
the Federal Judiciary to a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform.,,238 
Under Justice Scalia's approach, ATS suits could be based, at most, only on the 
customary international law principles that existed in 1938 or a treaty of the United 
States.239 
Justice Scalia made a strong argument that the majority's approach would 
allow lower courts to recognize many causes of action through the A TS even if the 
232 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733-38 (2004). 
233 !d. 
234Id. at 737. 
235Id. at 740--48 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
236 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
237 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 740--48 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
238Id. at 739; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 132. 
239 Although not finally decided until 1941, the lengthy Trail Smelter arbitration 
between the United States and Canada that began in 1928 and involved a U.S. claim 
against a Canadian smelter for transboundary pollution is an example of a principle of 
customary international law that arguably was recognized in 1938. The initial report was 
issued in the case in 1931 and a "final decision" was issued on April 16, 1938. Trail 
Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941); see HUNTER ET AL., 
supra note 65, at 543-50. 
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majority intended that courts adopt only a far smaller number of modern norms.240 
He pointed out that the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez-Machain had employed the same 
"specific, obligatory, and universal" test for when international norms are 
actionable under the ATS as the In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights 
Litigation opinion, which the majority had cited with approval.241 Under this test, 
the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez-Machain found the plaintiffs claims actionable under 
the ATS, which contradicts the majority's conclusion that the court of appeals' 
opinion "reflects a more assertive view of federal judicial discretion over claims 
based on customary international law than the position we take today.,,242 Justice 
Scalia pointedly observed that "endorsing the very formula that led the Ninth 
Circuit to its result in this action hardly seems to be a recipe for restraint in the 
future. ,,243 
Justice Scalia also criticized the Second Circuit's Kadic decision for 
recognizing a private right of action for genocide under the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide244 even though Congress had 
explicitly stated that the treaty was not to be understood as creating any substantive 
or procedural rights enforceable in U.S. courtS.245 The Kadic decision had argued 
that it was not recognizing a new right, but simply an existing right under the A TS 
that Congress had not repealed by implication?46 Justice Scalia argued that the 
majority opinion's approach failed to prevent lower courts from expanding the 
A TS to allow new private causes of action that were at odds with the positions of 
the political branches.247 
One may question Justice Scalia's implication that his approach is the only 
one that would prevent lower courts from exercising unbridled discretion in 
recognizing new norms ofinternationallaw.248 Yet he made a strong argument that 
the majority's test is loose enough to allow lower courts to enforce many 
international law norms through A TS suits that the majority would ultimately 
reject if they reviewed the case.249 He concluded: 
In today's latest victory for its Never Say Never Jurisprudence, the Court 
ignores its own conclusion that the A TS provides only jurisdiction, wags a 
finger at the lower courts for going too far, and then-repeating the same 
240 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 747--48 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 748 (quoting id. at 737 n.27 (majority opinion)). 
243 Id. 
244 Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U. N. T. S. 278. 
245 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748--49 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1092 (stating the Act shall not "be construed as 
creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any 
proceeding") . 
246 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,242 (2d Cir. 1995). 
247 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748--49 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
248 See id. at 746-50. 
249 See id. at 744. 
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formula the ambitious lower courts themselves have used-invites them to try 
again.250 
Because the Court reviews only a "tiny fraction" of lower court opinions, he 
argued, the lower courts would recognize many norms that the Court would reject 
if it had the time to review those cases.251 One lower court judge has agreed with 
Justice Scalia's argument that the majority's "open door" would result in 
inconsistencies among lower courts about whether they would recognize particular 
norms under the ATS.252 
C. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion 
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice 
Breyer argued that courts should apply international comity principles in deciding 
whether it was appropriate for a court in the United States to hear a case based on 
alleged violations that occurred in a foreign country.253 He suggested that comity 
considerations should limit A TS cases to heinous crimes that are both universally 
condemned and for which universal jurisdiction to prosecute is recognized?54 He 
observed that eighteenth-century international law recognized that any nation that 
found a pirate could prosecute him regardless of where the piracy occurred.255 
Justice Breyer implied that ATS suits should be limited to the small number of 
modem human rights abuses for which international law similarly recognized 
universal jurisdiction: torture, genocide, slavery, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.256 In the Sosa case, because there was no procedural consensus that claims 
of arbitrary arrest could be tried in any foreign court, Justice Breyer agreed that the 
Court should dismiss the plaintiff s A TS claims.257 
250 !d. at 750 . 
251 See id. at 750-51. 
252 In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The 
consequences of leaving that door open, as Justice Scalia stated, were not only to make the 
task of the lower federal courts immeasurably more difficult, but also to invite the kind of 
judicial creativity that has caused the disparity of results and differences of opinion that 
preceded the decision in Sosa."). 
253 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 760-63 (Breyer, 1., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
254 Id. at 762. 
255 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820»; see 
Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 132 ("Piracy's unique status as the benchmark for ATS 
claims is emphasized in Justice Breyer's concurrence .... "). 
256 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, 1., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) ("Today international law will sometimes similarly reflect not only substantive 
agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also procedural agreement that 
universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior. That subset includes 
torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes." (citations omitted». 
257Id. at 763. 
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D. Sosa and International Environmental Law Claims 
In different ways, Justice Scalia's approach and Justice Breyer's approach 
would bar almost all environmental claims under the ATS. By only considering 
pre-1938, pre-Erie, customary international law, Justice Scalia would ignore the 
tremendous development of international environmental law since 1938. Under 
Justice Breyer's international comity approach, it would be very difficult to use the 
A TS to file an environmental claim because there may be no purely environmental 
norm that is recognized as allowing suit in any country. Perhaps only a suit 
alleging that a defendant has deliberately used environmental pollution or 
destruction to cause harm would rise to that level because it is arguably a crime 
against humanity or war crime. The environmental devastation caused when 
Saddam Hussein deliberately blew up Kuwaiti oil wells when his invasion of that 
country was repulsed is one example that might possibly meet Justice Breyer's 
views.258 As will be discussed in Part V, the district court and court of appeals in 
Sarei considered whether the international comity doctrine justified the dismissal 
of the case, but did not apply as restrictive an approach as Justice Breyer's. 
The majority's standard of allowing ATS suits only if an alleged violation of 
customary law is comparable to eighteenth-century violations is less clear than one 
might hope, but the Court's definite content requirement and its indication that 
lower courts should sparingly allow A TS suits suggests that the Court would 
approve the generally negative reception to environmental claims in Beanal, 
Flores, Amlon, and Aguinda. Based on its requirement that modern customary 
international law must have a definite content comparable to the piracy and 
ambassador offenses recognized in the eighteenth century, the Supreme Court 
would likely reject claims based on broad environmental doctrines such as 
sustainable development or a right to health that have no clear boundaries just as 
those four lower court decisions rejected broad theories of environmental liability. 
V. SAREI 
The district court's opinion in Sarei I was decided before the Sosa decision. 
After the Supreme Court's Sosa decision, the Ninth Circuit had the parties reargue 
the case so it could consider the impact of Sosa on the case.259 In a 2006 decision, 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's decision that UNCLOS constitutes customary international law 
258 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing Saddam Hussein's destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells as example of a violation of 
customary international law); Laura Edgerton, Eco-Terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf 
War: Is International Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?, 22 GA. 1. INT'L & COMPo L. 151, 
165-73 (1992) (discussing whether Saddam Hussein's destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells was 
a violation of international law). 
259 See Sarei II, 456 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006), ajJ'd in part, vacated in part, 
rev'd in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
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that is cognizable under the ATS.26o On April 12, 2007, however, in response to 
the defendant's petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc, the three-judge 
panel withdrew its 2006 opinion and issued a superseding opinion and dissent. 261 
The majority did not decide whether the plaintiffs' substantive claims were valid, 
but did conclude that the allegations were sufficiently serious to warrant the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction.262 The 2007 opinion appeared to be most 
concerned with avoiding deciding the UNCLOS claim on the merits. The 2007 
opinion essentially adopted the same reasoning as the 2006 opinion in reversing 
the district court's dismissal of all claims as nonjusticiable political questions and 
vacating the district court's "dismissal of the UNCLOS claims on act of state and 
comity grounds, for reconsideration in light of [its] opinion.,,263 
Even though they may not cite the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision, 
plaintiffs in the future will likely rely on its reasoning in trying to convince courts 
to recognize UNCLOS and other environmental claims under the A TS. Because 
there are likely to be future cases involving UNCLOS and other environmental 
claims under the ATS, it is important to analyze whether the Ninth Circuit's 
reasoning in its withdrawn 2006 decision was convincing. The Ninth Circuit's 
withdrawn 2006 decision failed to consider the definite content portion of the Sosa 
decision when the court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that 
UNCLOS constitutes customary international law that is cognizable under ATS. 
The Ninth Circuit's 2007 decision avoided addressing the merits of the UNCLOS 
claim. On remand, the district court should hold that the UNCLOS claim is not 
cognizable under the A TS because the content of UNCLOS is not as definite as the 
norms recognized in 1789. 
A. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC-The District Court's Opinion 
1. The Plaintiffs' Allegations 
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (Sarei I), the plaintiffs, citizens of Papua New 
Guinea, alleged, inter alia, that defendant Rio Tinto' s mining operations destroyed 
their island's environment and harmed the health of its people.264 The defendant 
260 Sarei 11,456 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006). 
261 Sarei III, 487 F.3d 1193, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh'g granted, 499 
F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). Judge Bybee in his dissenting opinion again argued that the 
plaintiffs must first exhaust any legal remedies available in Papua New Guinea; he did not 
address whether UNCLOS claims are cognizable under the ATS. Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 
1224--46 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
262 Id. at 1202 (majority opinion). 
263Id. at 1224 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
264 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (CD. Cal. 2002), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd 
in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 487 
F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); see 
Boeving, supra note 25, at 123. The court also found that the plaintiffs' war crimes and 
crimes against humanity allegations presented cognizable A TS claims, but those issues are 
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allegedly dumped tailings from its mine into the Kawerong-Jaba river system, 
resulting in the destruction of the river valley, rain forests, and thousands of 
acres. 265 Furthermore, the tailings polluted the Empress Augusta Bay and killed 
many fish in the Bay, a major food source for the local population.266 As is 
discussed below, the plaintiffs alleged that some of the tailings entered 
international waters and harmed the Pacific Ocean.267 
2. Rejecting a Right to Life or Health 
The plaintiffs alleged that the environmental harms described in the complaint 
violated the law of nations and caused human rights violations infringing upon a 
"right to life" and "right to health" recognized in international law.268 Like the 
Flores II decision, the U.S. District Court for Central California in Sarei held that 
neither the "right to life" nor the "right to health" was sufficiently specific to form 
the basis for an A TS claim.269 Furthermore, the court found "that nations [did not] 
universally recognize [that such rights] can be violated by perpetrating 
environmental harm.,,27o The court determined that some of the international 
conventions271 relied upon by the plaintiff did not specifically address 
environmental harm, and those conventions that did address environmental harm 
did not provide "specific proscriptions" establishing mandatory international 
law.272 The court cited Beanal III in concluding that mere "allegations of 
beyond the scope of this Article. Sarei J, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (holding plaintiffs can 
bring war crime and crimes against humanity claims under A TS against defendant Rio 
Tinto PLC); see Boeving, supra note 25, at 123-24. 
265 Sarei J, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
266 !d. 
267 !d. at 1162. 
268 !d. at 1156; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 124. 
269 Sarei J, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1158; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 124. 
270 Sa rei J, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 ("Not all conduct which may be harmful to the 
environment, and not all violations of environmental laws, constitute violations of the law 
of nations." (citing Aguinda J, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4718, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 
1994))); see Boeving, supra note 25, at 124. 
271 Plaintiffs relied on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
19, 1966,6 LL.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration, 
supra note 151; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art. III, O.A.S. 
Res. XXX, Ninth International Conference of American States, O.A.S. Doc. OEAlSer. 
LIlA Rev. (1965) [hereinafter American Declaration]; American Convention on Human 
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American 
Convention]; African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,21 LL.M. 58, 
1520 U.N.T.S. 217; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No.5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 0.1. (C 364) 1. See Sarei J, 
221 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Boeving, supra note 25, at 124 n.l06. 
272 Sarei J, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1159; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 124-25. 
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environmental harm do not state a claim under the law of nations.,,273 
3. Sustainable Development 
The plaintiffs also argued that environmental harm alone violated the 
international law norms of sustainable development, which require States to avoid 
serious and irreversible environmental or human health impacts from development 
actions.274 As in the Flores II decision, the district court in Sarei I concluded that 
the principle of sustainable development was far too broad to create a cause of 
action under the A TS because even the plaintiffs' expert could not identify the 
limits of that "right.,,275 
4. UNCLOS 
The district court next considered whether UNCLOS constituted a "specific, 
universal, and obligatory" norm of the type that would support a claim for 
violation of the law of nations.276 The plaintiffs asserted that Rio Tinto's mining 
activities violated two provisions ofUNCLOS: 
(1) one requiring that states take "all measures ... that are necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment" 
that involves "hazards to human health, living resources and marine 
life through the introduction of substances into the marine 
environment·,,277 and , 
(2) another mandating that States "adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment 
caused by land-based sources.'.278 
Because 166 nations had ratified the treaty, the district court concluded that 
273 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1159 (citing Beanal III, 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 
1999»; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 125. 
274 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1160; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 125; UNCLOS, 
supra note 5. 
275 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1160-61; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 125. The 
Plaintiffs expert acknowledged that sustainable development may be "too broad a concept 
to be legally meaningful." Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
276 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
277 The first alleged UNCLOS violation refers to Article 194 and a paraphrase of 
Article 1(4), which defines "pollution of the marine environment." UNCLOS, supra note 5, 
art. 1(4). 
278 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss at 32-33). The second alleged UNCLOS 
violation refers to Article 207, which addresses land-based pollution. UNCLOS, supra note 
5, art. 207. 
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UNCLOS "appears to represent the law ofnations.,,279 
The district court also concluded as an additional factor that the United States 
had recognized UNCLOS as a norm of international law.28o In a footnote, the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Alaska stated that "[t]he United States has not 
ratified [UNCLOS], but has recognized that its baseline provisions reflect 
customary international law.,,281 Additionally, the United States had signed the 
treaty, although the Senate has not yet ratified it.282 When the President has signed 
a treaty that the Senate has neither ratified nor rejected, the United States under 
international law principles is required to avoid actions that would defeat the 
treaty's purposes.283 The district court in Sarei concluded that the plaintiffs could 
file an UNCLOS claim under the A TS because the convention was now a part of 
. . 11 284 customary mternatlOna aw. 
There are serious weaknesses in the district court's analysis of whether 
279 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; see United States v. Kun Yun Jho, 465 F. Supp. 
2d 618, 624-25 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United 
States, 38 F. Supp. 2d 168, 175 n.3 (D. P.R. 1999) (,,[T]here is a consensus among 
commentators that the provisions contained in UNCLOS III reflect customary international 
law and are thus binding on the United States, as well as all other nations, signatory or non-
signatory."), a./J'd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 297 (1st Cir. 1999); LORI FISLER DAMROSCH 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1383-84 (4th ed. 2001) (stating 
most provisions of the UNCLOS are clearly established customary law of the sea). 
280 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1132, 116l. But see David A. Ridenour, Ratification of 
the Law of the Sea Treaty: A Not-So-Innocent Passage, 542 NAT'L POL'y ANALYSIS (Aug. 
2006), http://www.nationalcenter.orgINPA542LawoftheSeaTreaty.html (last visited Sept. 
14,2007) (criticizing UNCLOS and arguing United States should not ratify it). 
281 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.lO (1992); see R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 
965 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding United States recognizes 200-mile economic zone in 
UNCLOS, although it has not ratified Convention); Kun fun Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 624-
25. 
282 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; see John A. Duff, The United States and the Law 
of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & 
COASTAL L.J. I (200512006) (discussing why Senate has delayed ratifying UNCLOS and 
arguing in favor of ratification). But see Michalski, supra note 93, at 752 (arguing "the 
Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that the United States has consistently refused to ratify the 
convention because of the 'risk that the United States-and other parties to the treaty-
may lose control of their environmental laws'" (quoting Ridenour, supra note 280»; 
Ridenour, supra note 280 (observing that the Senate has not ratified UNCLOS despite the 
recommendation of the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2004 that it do so and that "[t]he 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee determined that the risks to U.S. military activity 
were sufficient enough to address them in its Committee Report"). 
283 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; see Kun fun Jho, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 624-25; 
Mayaguezanos, 198 F.3d at 305 n.14 ("[W]e also note that the United States 'is obliged to 
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the agreement. '" (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312(3) 
(1987»); United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 24 F. Supp. 2d 155, 159 (D.P.R. 
1997). 
284 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1162; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 125. 
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UNCLOS codifies established nonns of customary international law. Although it 
referred several times to the "specific, universal, and obligatory" standard used by 
the Ninth Circuit to decide whether an international law principle is enforceable 
through the ATS,285 the district court never specifically addressed whether the 
UNCLOS provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs met that standard.286 The district 
court implied that UNCLOS is universal and obligatory when it emphasized the 
number of nations that had ratified UNCLOS and that the United States recognizes 
some provisions as "baseline provisions" of customary international law.287 The 
district court did not, however, address whether the UNCLOS provisions cited by 
the plaintiffs were specific enough to be actionable. Perhaps the district court 
implicitly concluded that the UNCLOS provisions cited by the plaintiffs were 
more specific than the "right to life," "right to health," and sustainable 
development claims that it had rejected, but the court did not analyze UNCLOS 
provisions in any depth. 
Even if UNCLOS represents customary international law, the defendants 
argued that the convention was inapplicable to the facts of the case because it only 
governs the "open sea"-international waters located beyond the twelve-mile limit 
of sovereign territorial jurisdiction.288 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' 
allegations that waste from the mine traveled "several kilometers" into Empress 
Bay failed to meet UNCLOS's open sea requirement.289 The district court rejected 
the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' allegations failed to meet UNCLOS's 
jurisdiction because the court found that the plaintiffs' allegations that the tailings 
had traveled "dozens of miles" to pollute the Bay and had also polluted the Pacific 
Ocean were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, pending further factual 
development.29o If the case proceeds to trial, the plaintiffs would have to 
demonstrate that toxic materials from the mine reached international waters more 
than twelve miles from Papau New Guinea?91 Additionally, the court concluded 
that A TS plaintiffs do not need to exhaust national remedies before filing suit 
under the statute, even if the defendants were correct that UNCLOS imposes such 
a requirement.292 
5. F(jrum Non Con viens 
The court next addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss the case on FNC 
grounds because Papua New Guinea was an adequate forum, or, alternatively, that 
Australia was a more appropriate forum than the United States to try the case.293 
285 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1132, 1137, 1157-61, 1163. 
286 Abadie, supra note 90, at 793. 
287 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; see Abadie, supra note 90, at 793-94. 
288 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 1162-63. 
291 Abadie, supra note 90, at 793-94. 
292 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1162--63; see infra Part V.B.3. 
293 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1166, 1175. The defendants also mentioned Great 
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Although the defendants were able to show that Papua New Guinea courts allow 
class actions and contingency fees, the court concluded that Papua New Guinea 
was not an adequate forum because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that 
they would have difficulty finding a local attorney who would be willing to 
represent them under a contingent-fee arrangement and that crucial witnesses 
would not testify in Papua New Guinea courts because of fear resulting from the 
country's recently ended ten-year civil war.294 The court suggested that the ATS 
expresses a policy preference for deciding international law issues in American 
courts, especially if the plaintiff is a lawful U.S. resident.295 While the plaintiffs 
might be able to raise common-law tort claims in Australia, the court concluded 
that Australia was an inadequate forum because many of the plaintiffs' A TS claims 
were not recognized under Australian law.296 
6. The State Department's Statement of Interest 
The defendants also sought to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it 
presented only nonjusticiable questions for three reasons: (1) the act of state 
doctrine, (2) the comity of nations doctrine, and (3) the political question 
doctrine.297 To assist it in evaluating the applicability of these doctrines, the court 
solicited the Department of State's opinion regarding the possibility that the case's 
adjudication would detrimentally impact foreign relations?98 The court observed 
that other decisions had considered the State Department's views before deciding a 
case.299 On November 5, 2001, the Attorney General, acting on behalf of the 
Department of State, filed a Statement of Interest (SOl) of the United States under 
28 U.S.C. § 516 and § 517 that attached an October 31,2001 letter from the State 
Department that argued that the suit "'would risk a potentially serious adverse 
impact on the [Bougainville] peace process, and hence on the conduct of [United 
States] foreign relations. ",300 The district court then allowed the plaintiffs and 
defendants to file responses to the SOL301 
The district court gave conclusive weight to the Department of State's SOl as 
to whether the litigation of the case would harm U.S. foreign relations and the 
peace process in Papua New Guinea.302 Rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the 
Britain as a possible alternative forum, but the defendants and court focused on Australia, 
and the court did not clearly decide whether Britain was an appropriate forum, although the 
lack of discussion by the court may indicate that it did not view Britain as a serious 
alternative. !d. at 1166,1175-78. 
294 !d. at 1166-75. 
295 Id. at 1175; see Hagen & Michaels, supra note 35, at 131. 
296 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-78. 
297 !d. at 1178-79. 
298 !d. at 1179-81. 
299Id. at 1179-80. 
300Id. at 1181 (quoting Statement of Interest of the United States filed in the case). 
301 Id. 
302Id. at 1181-82; see Baxter, supra note 230, at 836-37. 
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State Department had misunderstood the impact that the litigation would have on 
the Bougainville peace agreement, the court stated, "the court must accept the 
statement of foreign policy provided by the executive branch as conclusive of its 
view of that subject; it may not assess whether the policy articulated is wise or 
unwise, or whether it is based on misinformation or faulty reasoning. ,,303 The court 
refused to consider evidence from the plaintiffs arguing that the Papua New 
Guinea government had mislead the State Department regarding the impact of the 
litigation on the peace process because investigating this issue would interfere with 
the executive branch's prerogatives in conducting foreign affairs and thus violate 
the separation of powers. 304 
7. The Act of State Doctrine 
The district court next considered whether the act of state doctrine required 
the dismissal of the environmental and other ATS claims.305 Pursuant to the act of 
state doctrine, a federal court may not adjudicate a claim if a decision would 
require a court to "invalidate a foreign sovereign's official acts within its own 
territory" and, therefore, interfere with the executive branch or legislative branch's 
conduct of foreign policy, especially with that foreign sovereign.306 The act of state 
doctrine bar to litigation applies only if the outcome of the case "involves (1) an 
official act of a foreign sovereign, (2) performed within its own territory, and (3) 
seeks relief that would require the court to declare the foreign sovereign's act 
invalid. ,,307 
In Sarei I, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' environmental claims 
were barred under the act of state doctrine because its mining activities were 
pursuant to a Copper Agreement between its subsidiary, Rio Tinto, and the Papua 
New Guinea government, which was later codified.308 Because all of its mining 
activities were regulated under Papua New Guinea law, the defendants argued that 
the plaintiffs' environmental claims would improperly require the court to judge 
whether Papua New Guinea's acts as a foreign sovereign in regulating mining 
violated the law ofnations.309 
Although the defendants sought to dismiss only the environmental claims 
under the act of state doctrine, the district court decided to consider whether all of 
the claims were barred under the doctrine. 310 In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, a key act of state case, the Supreme Court applied a balancing approach 
to decide if adjudication of international law claims would violate the act of state 
doctrine by interfering too much with a foreign nation's sovereignty and, as a 
303 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1181-82 (footnote and citations omitted). 
304 ld. at 1182. 
3051d. at 1183-88; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 125. 
306 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
307 ld. at 1184 (citations omitted). 
308/d. 
3091d. 
310 ld. at 1184--85. 
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result, the United States' foreign relations with that country.311 Thus, if the 
defendant demonstrates that a government acted in its sovereign capacity and has a 
serious interest in the issue being adjudicated, a court then examines whether the 
three factors "set forth in Sabbatino-international consensus; impact on foreign 
relations; and the continued existence of the government-support or undermine 
application of the act of state doctrine to bar plaintiffs' claims.,,312 
In Sarei I, the district court observed that the defendants had the burden of 
proving that the act of state doctrine applies. 313 Reviewing the defendants' 
argument that the act of state doctrine barred the case's litigation in U.S. courts, 
the court first considered whether the case required it to adjudicate a foreign 
sovereign's actions. Next, the court applied the Sabbatino factors to balance the 
need for adjudication in the United States with possible interference with the 
foreign nation's sovereignty and U.S. foreign relations. 
First, because the plaintiffs alleged that Rio Tinto and the government of 
Papua New Guinea were joint venture partners who acted in concert in allegedly 
violating customary international law in the construction and operation of the 
mine, and because their joint relationship was officially codified in the Copper 
Agreement, the court found that "there is a strong likelihood that the court will be 
required to assess the legality of [Papua New Guinea's] official conduct.,,314 Since 
the plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant was a state actor, which is a necessary 
element in proving the UNCLOS and racial discrimination claims, the district court 
rejected as inconsistent the plaintiffs' attempt to argue that the act of state doctrine 
should not apply because only Rio Tinto was responsible for the pollution when 
Papua New Guinea had the "power to control and monitor pollution generated by 
the mine.,,315 Thus, as the plaintiffs' claims regarding the defendants' liability were 
based on its alleged joint venture with the national government as codified in the 
Copper Agreement and their joint construction and operation of the mine, the court 
concluded that it must dismiss the environmental and racial discrimination claims 
based on the act of state doctrine because it could find violations against the 
defendant only if it also found that Papua New Guinea's "official acts were invalid 
as well.,,316 On the other hand, the court found that the act of state doctrine did not 
bar the plaintiffs' claims based on torture or war crimes as such actions, if true, are 
never considered official acts of state because they violate fundamental norms of 
internationallaw.317 
The district court next applied the three Sabbatino factors to the 
environmental and racial discrimination claims. First, under the degree of 
international consensus factor, the court found that there was international 
consensus regarding the enforcement ofUNCLOS under international law, but that 
311 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964); see Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
312 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
313 /d. 
314Id. at 1185-87. 
315Id. at 1187 n.260. 
316Id. at 1188. 
317Id. 
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there was no consensus regarding whether the other environmental tort claims 
were violations of internationallaw.318 
Second, under the implications for foreign relations factor, the district court 
gave great weight to the SOl. In the SOl, the State Department argued that the suit 
"would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on the peace process" and thus 
harm the United States' foreign relations with Papua New Guinea.319 The court 
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Department of State's concerns were 
based on erroneous information supplied in a statement by the Papua New Guinea 
government because the State Department's assessment did not rely solely on the 
country's statement in issuing its opinion about the impact of the litigation on the 
peace process, but also "expressions of concern from countries it regards as 
allies.,,320 Although the views of the State Department in an SOl are not conclusive 
when a court addresses the act of state doctrine, the court found that there was not 
a single case in which a court had allowed a suit to proceed in light of concerns as 
serious as expressed in this SOI.321 Thus, the court found that the second Sabbatino 
factor weighed in favor of dismissing the case.322 
Finally, the third Sabbatino factor is whether the government allegedly 
responsible for the alleged international law violations is still in existence at the 
time of the suit. 323 The district court found that there was no evidence that the 
"control" of the Papua New Guinea government had changed since the alleged 
claims in the suit and therefore that the third factor weighed in favor of dismissing 
the suit. 324 
Thus, because the third and especially the second Sabbatino factors weighed 
against the court hearing the case, the district court dismissed the environmental 
and racial discrimination claims under the act of state doctrine.325 The district court 
explained that the second Sabbatino factor of potential for interference with our 
foreign relations was the "touchstone" or "crucial element" in making its 
decision.326 As the Ninth Circuit later concluded, it is fair to say that the SOl was 
the most important factor in the district court's dismissal of the environmental and 
racial discrimination claims under the act of state doctrine.327 
318 Id. at 1189-90. The court found a "high degree of consensus" that official acts of 
racial discrimination violate jus cogens principles of customary international law. [d. 
319Id. at 1190-92. 
320 Id. 
321Id. at 1192. 
322 I d. 
323Id. at 1192-93. 
324 !d. at 1193. By the time that the Ninth Circuit decided the case on appeal, there 
was an apparent issue regarding whether the government was still in existence and the 
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further fact finding on that issue. 
325Id. 
326 Id. (quoting Liu v. P.R.C., 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
327 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (explaining that "based on ... the [SOl], it would 
be appropriate to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in this case"). 
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8. The Political Question Doctrine 
The district court next addressed whether the political question doctrine 
required it to dismiss all claims because federal court involvement in the case 
would interfere with foreign relations between the United States and Papua New 
Guinea.328 The political question doctrine requires courts to consider whether the 
adjudication of a case raises issues that are more appropriately decided by the 
politically elected legislative or executive branches, although there is controversy 
about whether the doctrine is a mandatory jurisdictional or a discretionary 
prudential limitation on the authority of federal COurtS.329 Most frequently, the 
doctrine is applied to bar adjudication of cases that would significantly interfere 
with U.S. foreign relations.33o 
Relying on the SOl, the district court found that the suit would interfere with 
the State Department's support for the Papua New Guinea government and its 
efforts to negotiate a peace agreement in Bougainville.331 Applying a six-factor test 
from the Supreme Court's Baker v. Carr decision,332 the district court concluded 
that the suit would violate at least two factors, the impossibility of the courts 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect for 
coordinate branches of government, and the potentiality of embarrassment to our 
country from "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.,,333 Accordingly, the district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims 
pursuant to the political question doctrine.334 
328 !d. at 1193-99; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 126 n.117. 
329 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 n.273. 
330 !d. at 1193-94. 
331 Id. at 1196-99. 
332 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The six factors are: 
(1) "the existence of any] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department"; 
(2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving 
[the claims]"; 
(3) "the impossibility of deciding without an initial, [nonjudicial], policy 
determination"; 
(4) "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due for the coordinate branches of 
government" ; 
(5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision 
already made"; and 
(6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question." 
Id.at217. 
333 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1197-99 (quoting factors four and six in Baker, 369 
u.s. at 217). 
334 !d. at 1198-99. 
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9. The International Comity Doctrine 
The court also considered the doctrine of international comity as an 
alternative ground for dismissing the environmental and racial discrimination 
claims because of compensation remedies in Papua New Guinea law.335 
International comity is a discretionary doctrine under which a court may defer to 
the laws or interests of a foreign country and decline to exercise the jurisdiction it 
otherwise would have for reasons of practice, convenience, or expediency.336 
Pursuant to § 403(2) of the Restatement (Third), there are eight factors that a court 
may consider in determining whether it should invoke the international comity 
doctrine.337 Perhaps the most important Restatement factor is whether there is a 
conflict between the laws of the interested states; in this case, between American 
and Papua New Guinea law.338 
The district court concluded that there was a direct conflict between the A TS 
and Papua New Guinea's 1995 Compensation Act, which "prohibit[s] the taking or 
pursuing in foreign courts of legal proceedings in relation to compensation claims 
arising from mining projects and petroleum projects in Papua New Guinea," 
because the A TS allows federal courts to hear the plaintiffs' claims, but the 
Compensation Act prohibits plaintiffs from filing the claims other than in Papua 
New Guinea courts.339 Papua New Guinea initially did not assert its right under the 
Compensation Act, but later did in a statement issued to the U.S. ambassador to 
Papua New Guinea in 2001.340 Because of the conflict between the ATS and the 
Compensation Act, the district court found that the defendants had met the 
threshold requirement for invoking the international comity doctrine.341 The 
district court concluded that it was appropriate to dismiss the environmental and 
racial discrimination claims pursuant to the international comity doctrine for three 
reasons: first, the SOl asserted that litigating the ATS claims in federal court would 
be detrimental to United States interests; second, the alleged conduct occurred 
solely in Papua New Guinea; and, third, all of the plaintiffs except Sarei were 
Papua New Guinea residents. 342 
In Jota v. Texaco, Inc., the Second Circuit had held that the comity doctrine 
should be applied only if there was an adequate forum in the objecting country.343 
By contrast, the Supreme Court in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. implied but did 
not decide that the comity doctrine could be applied without considering all the 
335Id. at 1199-1206; see Boeving, supra note 25, at 126 n.118. 
336 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. 
337 Id. at 1199-1200; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 403(2) (1987). 
338 See Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1200-01. 
339/d. at 1201-02. 
340Id. at 1202-03. 
341Id. at 1204. 
342Id. at 1205-07. 
343 157 F.3d 153,160 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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factors considered in a FNC motion, which would include a decision on whether 
there is an adequate forum. 344 The district court did not resolve whether Jota was 
inconsistent with Quackenbush because it found that Papua New Guinea was an 
adequate forum. 
Although it had considered the plaintiffs' fears of appearing in Papua New 
Guinea courts in assessing whether private interests favor an FNC dismissal, the 
district court found that the plaintiffs' fears did not make Papua New Guinea an 
inadequate forum because the defendants had represented that they would not seek 
to bar the plaintiffs from filing a claim under the Compensation Act, even though 
the Act prohibits bringing a second action in Papua New Guinea. The court made 
all of its dismissals-whether under comity, act of state, or political question 
grounds--contingent upon the defendants' consent to allowing the action to 
proceed in Papua New Guinea courts, despite the provision in the Compensation 
Act or other statutes that might bar adjudication there.345 
The court refused to dismiss the war crimes and crimes against humanity 
claims under the international comity doctrine because they are outside the mining 
operations covered by the Compensation Act, but instead involved the Papua New 
Guinea's alleged actions during the civil war in Bougainville.346 Additionally, 
because comity is a discretionary doctrine, the court refused to apply the doctrine 
to these claims because they involved egregious alleged conduct that may not be 
characterized as an act of state.347 Although it had deferred to the SOl in 
dismissing all claims under the political question doctrine, the court did not believe 
that dismissal of the war crimes and crimes against humanity claims was 
appropriate under the comity doctrine even in light of the foreign relations 
concerns raised in the SOe48 The court believed its refusal to dismiss these claims 
for comity reasons was "particularly true" in light of the fact that the SOl itself 
stated that the State Department had expressed concerns to Papua New Guinea 
about alleged human rights abuses during the civil war.349 
10. The SOl Was the Key to the District Court's Decision 
The district court gave conclusive weight to the SOl in making its decision to 
dismiss all claims under the political question doctrine.35o The court also relied on 
the SOl to dismiss the environmental and racial discrimination claims under the act 
344 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (,,[F]ederal courts abstain [on comity grounds] out of 
deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with 
principles of comity and federalism. Dismissal for forum non conveniens, by contrast, has 
historically reflected a far broader range of considerations .... " (internal citations 
omitted». 
345 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. 2d at 1208--09. 
346 Id. at 1207. 
347 !d. 
348 !d. at 1207 n.295. 
349 !d. 
350 See Baxter, supra note 230, at 836-37. 
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of state and international comity doctrines, although it refused to dismiss the war 
crimes and crimes against humanity claims under those two doctrines.351 Thus, a 
crucial question on appeal was whether the district court had given too much 
deference to the SOI.352 
B. Sarei-The Ninth Circuit's Partial Affirmance, 
Reversal and Remand in its Withdrawn 2006 Decision 
Because the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision discussed whether an 
alleged violation of UNCLOS can establish a cognizable A TS claim, it is 
important to analyze the 2006 decision in detail even though it no longer has 
official legal recognition. Even though they may not cite the Ninth Circuit's 
withdrawn 2006 decision, plaintiffs in the future will likely rely on its reasoning in 
trying to convince courts to recognize UNCLOS and other environmental claims 
under the A TS. Thus, because there are likely to be future cases involving 
UNCLOS and other environmental claims under the ATS, it is important to 
analyze whether the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in its withdrawn 2006 decision was 
convincing. After the Supreme Court's Sosa decision, the Ninth Circuit requested 
reargument in Sarei so the parties could address any changes in the law resulting 
from Sosa.353 This Section will focus on two related issues in the Ninth Circuit's 
withdrawn 2006 decision: (1) the UNCLOS claim and (2) the amount of deference 
that courts should give to the SOl in deciding the political question, act of state, 
and international comity defenses. 
1. UNCLOS 
First, the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision affirmed the district court's 
conclusion that the UNCLOS claim could provide a basis for an ATS claim 
because ratification of the Convention by 149 nations was sufficient to make 
UNCLOS part of customary international law.354 Similarly, both Sosa and 
Filartiga treated provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as evidence of customary international law even though neither is 
351 Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-89. 
352 Sarei II, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006), afJ'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd 
in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th CiT. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th CiT. 
2007). 
353 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1077. 
354 Id. at 1078. But see John Knox, Case of the Month: Sarei v. Rio Tinto, Opinio 
Juris, Sept. I, 2006, http://www.opiniojuris.org/postsIl15706144l.shtml ("[T]here is no 
rule whereby treaties are magically converted to customary international law upon reaching 
149 parties."); Michalski, supra note 93, at 752 (same). The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the 
district court's determination that the plaintiffs' war crimes, violations of the law of wars, 
and racial discrimination allegations presented cognizable ATS claims, although those 
issues are beyond the scope ofthis Article. Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1078. 
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self-executing or directly binding.355 The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the 
district court that the act of state doctrine was a possible defense because there was 
insufficient evidence that UNCLOS's norms were jus cogens norms that no state 
may violate.356 The Ninth Circuit implicitly recognized that prior cases such as 
Sosa and Filartiga had limited jus cogens norms to serious human rights abuses 
such as torture and that no case had yet treated environmental harms as jus cogens 
norms.357 
A major weakness of the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision is that the 
court never addressed Sosa 's specific test that rights under modem international 
law may provide the basis for A TS suits only if they "rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we have 
recognized.,,358 The Ninth Circuit never explicitly addressed whether UNCLOS 
violations are comparable to eighteenth-century violations such as piracy. The 
court of appeals implicitly addressed the widely accepted prong of the test stating 
that UNCLOS had been ratified by most nations and that the United States had 
recognized the Convention's baseline provisions as reflecting customary 
international law.359 The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to address whether the 
UNCLOS marine pollution provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs have a definite 
and specific content comparable to eighteenth century norms such as piracy, which 
Part VI. C will address in detail. 
2. The Statement of Interest 
Second, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of all claims 
in the case as nonjusticiable political questions, including the UNCLOS claim, 
355 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 n.23 (2004) (observing Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights "has nevertheless had substantial indirect effect on 
international law"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (1980). The Filartiga court 
explained that the United Nations Charter's prohibition against torture 
has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 
(III)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states, in the plainest of terms, 'no one shall be 
subjected to torture.' The General Assembly has declared that the Charter 
precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration 'constitute basic principles of 
international law.' G.A.Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). 
[d. (footnote omitted); see also IAN BROWLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
535 (Oxford Univ. Press, USA, 6th ed. 2003) (calling the Declaration a "good example of 
an informal prescription given legal significance by the actions of authoritative decision-
makers"); Stephens, supra note 74, at 552. 
356 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1085-86. 
357 See id. 
358 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
359 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1078. 
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because the court of appeals concluded that the district court had applied the 
doctrine improperly by giving too much deference to the SOe60 Specifically, the 
Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision concluded or suggested that the district 
court gave too much weight and deference to the sal in deciding the political 
question, act of state, and international comity motions to dismiss. The court's 
orders to the district court, however, varied somewhat for each of these three 
separate and unique defenses because the weight given to the sal is different for 
each doctrine. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal 
of the UNCLOS claim on act of state grounds and remanded the case to the district 
court for reconsideration of the sal because the court of appeals concluded that 
the district court had relied too heavily upon the State Department's sal to justify 
the dismissal of the case.361 Finally, although finding that the district court's 
dismissal of the UNCLOS claims on international comity grounds was within its 
discretion, the Ninth Circuit nevertheless vacated the comity portion of the 
decision so the district court could reconsider the comity grounds in light of the 
Ninth Circuit's rejection of the lower court's overreliance on the State 
Department's SOI.362 Also, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to consider 
any new factual information about whether the Papua New Guinea government's 
past opposition to the suit had changed.363 
3. Exhaustion of Foreign Remedies 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision affirmed the district 
court's conclusion that the ATS does not contain a requirement that the plaintiffs 
exhaust any local remedies in Papua New Guinea before suing in a United States 
federal court.364 Interestingly, in a footnote, the Supreme Court in Sosa observed 
that the European Commission in an amicus curiae brief had argued that 
international law requires a claimant to exhaust its remedies in local courts before 
seeking an A TS remedy in American courts and commented that the Court "would 
certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.,,365 Yet, the Ninth 
Circuit in Sarei II noted that neither the Court nor any courts of appeals had 
resolved the exhaustion issue and that its circuit precedent had not required 
exhaustion in ATS cases.366 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it would not 
impose an exhaustion requirement on plaintiffs because the A TS contains no 
360 Sarei 11,456 F.3d at 1079-84; see Baxter, supra note 230, at 837. 
361 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1085-86. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's 
dismissal on act of state grounds because the court of appeals concluded that the 
prohibition against racial discrimination is a jus cogens norm that can never be justified 
under the act of state doctrine because international law does not allow acts of racial 
discrimination to be characterized as official acts of a state. !d. at 1085. 
362 Id. at 1086-88. 
363 1d. 
364 !d. at 1089-99. 
365 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
366 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1089-90. 
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explicit exhaustion requirement, unlike the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act/67 
which does contain an explicit exhaustion requirement.368 In his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Bybee argued that the ATS and general principles of international 
law required plaintiffs to exhaust any local remedies in Papua New Guinea before 
suing in federal court.369 
4. The Political Question Doctrine 
The district court had relied heavily upon the SOl in deciding that it should 
dismiss all claims as nonjusticiable political questions under the fourth and sixth 
Baker factors. 37o In reviewing whether the district court had given appropriate 
weight to the SOl, the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision reviewed other 
courts' treatment of SOls to determine how much weight should be given to the 
SOl in the Sarei case.37I The Ninth Circuit observed that several courts of appeals 
had given respect and deference to SOls, but these courts had not treated the 
statements as conclusive in determining whether a court would take jurisdiction in 
a particular case.372 In Sosa, the Supreme Court had stated that "there is a strong 
argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch's 
view of the case's impact on foreign policy.,,373 Although some courts had "found 
a nonjusticiable political question where the State Department had indicated that a 
judicial decision would impinge upon important foreign policy interests," the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that it would give "serious weight" to the SOl, but would 
not treat the statement as "controlling on [its] determination of whether the fourth 
through sixth Baker factors are present.,,374 The Sarei court explained, 
"[u]1timately, it is our responsibility to determine whether a political question is 
present, rather than to dismiss on that ground simply because the Executive Branch 
expresses some hesitancy about a case proceeding.,,375 
Applying the "serious weight" standard for evaluating SOls, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that, although it was a close question, the SOl in this case did not 
establish any of the final three Baker factors, which require that the case be 
367 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
368 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1090-95, 1098-99. 
369Id. at 1100-22. 
370Id. at 1080; supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text. 
371 Sarei 11,456 F.3d at 1080-81. 
372 Id.; see Baxter, supra note 230, at 836. 
373 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). 
374 Sarei 11, 456 F.3d at 1081. The fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors are: "the 
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government," "an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made," and "the potentiality of embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186,217(1962). 
375 Sa rei II, 456 F.3d at 1081. 
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dismissed only if those factors are "inextricable from the case.,,376 The SOl had 
raised concerns that adjudication of the case "would risk a potentially serious 
adverse impact on the peace process, and hence on the conduct of our foreign 
relations.,,377 The statement also noted the strong objections of the Papua New 
Guinea government and observed that "[ c ]ountries participating in the multilateral 
peace process have raised this concern" as well.378 Because there was little other 
evidence suggesting that the case should be dismissed under the political question 
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit observed that the SOl "must carry the primary burden 
of establishing a political question.,,379 In many other cases where courts had 
dismissed litigation pursuant to the doctrine, the Sarei II court noted that there 
were independent reasons for finding that adjudicating the claims would interfere 
with executive prerogatives without considering an SOl.380 Because the United 
States has had little involvement with the civil war in Bougainville, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that there would be little reason to dismiss the case absent the 
SOl.381 
After giving the SOl "serious weight," the Sarei II court concluded that a 
political question was not presented in the case. The Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 
2006 decision determined that "[ e ]ven if the continued adjudication of this case 
does present some risk to the Bougainville peace process, that is not sufficient to 
implicate the final three Baker factors.,,382 The Sarei II court characterized the final 
three Baker factors as requiring a court to find that it would be "impossibl[e]" to 
adjudicate the case "without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government," "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made," or "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.,,383 The Ninth Circuit 
observed that the State Department had not explicitly asked the district court to 
dismiss the case on political question grounds and therefore the court concluded 
that the adjudication of the suit would not express lack of respect for the executive 
branch.384 Additionally, the Sarei II court did not find any "unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence" to the SOl.385 Finally, because the SOl expressed its 
376Id. (quoting Baker, 369 u.s. at 217). 
377 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1082 n.lO. 
378Id. 




383Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962». 
384 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1082. The SOl did observe that the district court had not 
invited the State Department to address whether the case should be dismissed on political 
question grounds. Id. at 1081-82. In a footnote, the court observed that "[w]e need not 
determine whether a refusal to honor an explicit request to dismiss would constitute 
sufficient 'disrespect' to warrant dismissal under this factor, although we note the Second 
Circuit's conclusion in Kadic that it would not." Id. at 1082 n.12. 
385 Id. at 1082. 
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views in a "guarded" manner, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there would be no 
"embarrassment" to the State Department if the court made an independent 
determination of whether the case should proceed.386 Similarly, in Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., the D.C. Circuit recently agreed with Sarei II's approach to SOls and 
the political question doctrine.387 
Accordingly, applying the "serious weight" standard from Sosa, the Ninth 
Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision determined that it would be inappropriate to 
uphold the district court's dismissal of the case "solely on the basis of the SOI.,,388 
With little evidence other than the SOl supporting dismissal, the Ninth Circuit held 
that none of the plaintiffs' claims presented nonjusticiable political questions and 
therefore reversed the district court's dismissal pursuant to that doctrine.389 
Additionally, in a footnote, the court of appeals suggested that the SOl's concerns 
about the impact of the litigation on American foreign policy would be cast into 
doubt if plaintiffs' allegations that the Papua New Guinea government no longer 
opposed the suit were "authenticated" by the district court on remand.390 
5. Act of State Doctrine 
The district court dismissed the UNCLOS claims under the act of state 
doctrine, which prohibits American courts from adjudicating the "validity of the 
public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory.,,391 
The Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision agreed with the district court's 
conclusion that Papua New Guinea's actions under the Copper Act to exploit its 
mineral resources are "public acts of the sovereign.,,392 Additionally, the court of 
appeals agreed with the district court that while UNCLOS was part of customary 
international law, the plaintiffs had failed to prove that UNCLOS norms were jus 
cogens norms than no state may violate.393 The Ninth Circuit observed that 
"although the UNCLOS codifies norms of customary international law ... it is not 
yet clear whether 'the international community recognizes the norm[s]'" as jus 
386 Id. 
387 473 F.3d 345, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing Sarei's approach to political 
question doctrine with approval). But see id. at 366--67 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing and disagreeing with Ninth Circuit's refusal in Sarei to defer to State 
Department's Statement ofInterest and arguing District Court in Sarei properly deferred to 
SOl). 
388 Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1082-83. 
389 Id. at 1083-84. 
390 !d. at 1076-77 (acknowledging plaintiffs' allegations that the Papua New Guinea 
government no longer opposes suit); id. at 1083 n.13 (observing that plaintiffs' claim that 
the Papua New Guinea government no longer opposes suit must be "authenticated," but if 
true would cast doubts on conclusion in SOl). 
391 !d. at 1084-85. 
392 Id. at 1085 (citation omitted). 
393 Id. at 1085-86. 
HeinOnline -- 2007 Utah L. Rev. 1141 2007
2007] USING ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES To SUE UNDER THE ATS 1141 
cogens nonns that may not be violated by a State.394 Accordingly, the court of 
appeals concluded that even though UNCLOS violations are violations of 
international law, "the UNCLOS provisions at issue do not yet have a status that 
would prevent Papua New Guinea's acts from simultaneously constituting official 
sovereign acts.,,395 Furthennore, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's 
detennination that the adjudication of the UNCLOS claim would have required the 
court to judge the validity of Papua New Guinea's official actions in regulating the 
defendants' mining operations.396 
If a rule of customary international law has not yet obtained jus cogens status, 
a court applies the Sabbatino factors as a balancing test in detennining whether the 
act of state doctrine bars consideration of the case.397 In addition, a court in an A TS 
case should consider whether the alleged violation of customary international law 
meets the Sosa standard of having a widespread acceptance and definite content 
comparable to claims recognized in 1789 and not apply the act of state doctrine if 
the claim meets the Sosa standard.398 A principle of customary international law 
that meets Sosa's standard is consistent with the spirit of Sabbatino 's principle that 
courts should not apply the act of state doctrine if the claim involves "other 
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles.,,399 
The court of appeals' withdrawn 2006 decision next reviewed whether the 
district court appropriately applied the Sabbatino factors in deciding that the act of 
state doctrine barred any further consideration of the UNCLOS claim.40o The Ninth 
Circuit observed that "the district court's application of the Sabbatino factors 
relied in part on the SOl's assertion" that continued litigation of the case would 
hann American relations with Papua New Guinea.401 Since it had rejected the 
district court's application of the SOl in addressing the political question doctrine 
and the district court had relied heavily on the SOl in dismissing the UNCLOS 
claim under the act of state doctrine, the court of appeals considered it "prudent" to 
vacate the district court's dismissal of the UNCLOS claim pursuant to the act of 
state doctrine for reconsideration in view of the Ninth Circuit's analysis and 
discussion of the SOI.402 The court of appeals acknowledged, however, that the act 
of state analysis was not identical to the political question analysis.403 The Ninth 
Circuit suggested that the SOl was less of a factor in applying the act of state 
analysis than the political question analysis because foreign policy was only one of 
several Sabbatino factors, and thus foreign relations played a smaller role than in 
394 I d. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
395Id. at 1086. 
396 I d. 
397 See Holt, supra note 41, at 489-90. 
398 See id. at 480-90; Knox, supra note 354. 
399 Holt, supra note 41 at 481 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 376 
U.S. 398,428 (1964». 
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the Baker factors for the political question doctrine.404 Additionally, the court of 
appeals encouraged the district court to consider the plaintiffs' claim that the Papua 
New Guinea government had changed since the lower court's decision and 
therefore whether the government which had perpetrated the challenged act of state 
'11 .. 405 was stl III eXIstence. 
6. International Comity 
The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' UNCLOS claims under the 
international comity doctrine, which is a discretionary doctrine allowing courts to 
decline jurisdiction over issues that affect the laws and interests of a foreign nation 
and may be better adjudicated in that nation's courtS.406 The Ninth Circuit's 
withdrawn 2006 decision agreed with the district court in assuming that a true 
conflict between a foreign law and the exercise of American jurisdiction is 
required before a court may invoke the comity doctrine.407 The court of appeals 
concluded that the district court's determination-that Papua New Guinea's 
Compensation Act, which requires all mining compensation claims to be litigated 
in Papua New Guinea courts, conflicted with adjudication of the case-was "not 
an abuse of discretion.,,408 
The Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 decision determined that the district 
court had acted within its discretion in dismissing the UNCLOS claim on 
international comity grounds, but it vacated the lower court's comity ruling for 
reconsideration in light of the court of appeal's analysis of the SOI.409 As it had 
with the district court's dismissal of the UNCLOS claim pursuant to the act of state 
doctrine, the Ninth Circuit stated that it was "prudent" for the district court to 
reconsider its reliance on the SOl in the comity context because the court of 
appeals had rejected the district court's reliance on the SOl in its political question 
doctrine analysis.410 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the district court 
reconsider its application of the Restatement factors in light of factual 
developments since its initial decision.411 The court of appeals did not explain 
which factual developments might be relevant so it is not possible to be certain 
whether these factual developments apply to the UNCLOS claim, the racial 
discrimination claim, or both. On remand, if the district court finds that the 
plaintiffs' allegations that the Papua New Guinea government no longer opposes 
the litigation, but instead prefers that the case be decided in American courts are 
true, then the district court might find that the comity doctrine no longer requires 
404 Id. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. at 1086-87. The district court also dismissed the racial discrimination claim on 
comity grounds, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. !d. at 1087. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. at 1087-88. 
409 Id. at 1088-89. 
410 Id. at 1088. 
411 Id. 
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the dismissal of the UNCLOS or racial discrimination claims.412 
C. The Ninth Circuit's 2007 Decision 
The Ninth Circuit's 2007 decision reached essentially the same conclusion 
and order as its prior withdrawn decision. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court's dismissal of all claims as nonjusticiable political questions. It reversed the 
district court's dismissal of the racial discrimination claim on act of state grounds, 
and vacated the district court's dismissal of the racial discrimination claim on 
comity grounds and remanded its dismissal of the UNCLOS claims on act of state 
and comity grounds, for reconsideration in light of its opinion.413 The 2007 
decision, however, avoided the thorny question of whether the plaintiffs' 
substantive claims were cognizable on the merits by concluding that the allegations 
were sufficiently serious to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction and then 
sending the case back to the district court.414 
1. Jurisdiction 
In deciding whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction under the A TS, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on its precedent establishing that "'a motion to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim is proper 
only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous.".415 Because the plaintiffs 
alleged several claims asserting jus cogens violations including allegations of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and racial discrimination, the court easily found 
that the claims were not frivo10US.416 It is significant that the court did not list the 
UNCLOS claim among the potential jus cogens violations and later stated that it 
was "not yet clear" whether UNCLOS's norms are jus cogens norms from which 
no derogation is allowed.417 Because the plaintiffs had raised serious, nonfrivolous 
claims, the Ninth Circuit concluded "we need not and do not decide whether 
plaintiffs' substantive claims and theories of vicarious liability constitute valid 
A TCA claims after Sosa .'.418 The court then turned to questions of justiciability, 
which this Article will briefly discuss, and of exhaustion, an issue which is beyond 
the scope of this Article other than to observe that the discussion of the issue is 
identical in the 2006 and 2007 opinions.419 
412 See supra note 390. 
413 Sarei III, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en bane reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th 
Cir. 2007). See infra Part V.C.2. 
414 Sarei Ill, at 1201-03. 
415 Id. at 1200 (quoting Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 
730, 734 (9th Cir. 1979». 
416 Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1202-03. 
417 Id. at 1202, 1210. 
418 Id. at 1203. 
419 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1203-23, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d 1069, 1079-99 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
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2. Justiciability 
In "hold[ing] that none of the plaintiffs' claims present nonjusticiable political 
questions" and in reversing the district court's dismissal on that ground, the 2007 
opinion essentially copied its discussion of that issue in the 2006 opinion.42o The 
2007 opinion adopted the same approach as the withdrawn 2006 opinion in 
concluding that Sosa's "serious weight" standard did not require courts to give 
conclusive weight to the State Department's interests, and that the district court 
had erred in giving essentially conclusive weight to the SOl.421 In reversing the 
district court's dismissal of the alleged racial discrimination claim on act of state 
grounds, the 2007 decision copied the 2006 opinion in concluding that acts of 
racial discrimination are violations of jus cogens norms that cannot constitute 
official sovereign acts.422 In vacating the district court's dismissal of the alleged 
UNCLOS violations on act of state grounds, the 2007 opinion made one significant 
change to the 2006 opinion. The 2006 opinion had concluded that UNCLOS 
constituted customary international law, but the 2007 opinion did not reach the· 
issue on the merits and simply treated the issue as sufficiently important to justify 
remanding the question to the district court for a reconsideration of the dismissal in 
light of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the SOI.423 In vacating the district court's 
dismissal of the racial discrimination claims and the UNCLOS claims on 
international comity grounds for reconsideration in light of its analysis of the SOl, 
the 2007 opinion used the same language as the 2006 opinion.424 
3. Why Did the Panel Majority Withdraw its 2006 Decision? 
The 2007 opinion does not address why the panel majority withdrew its 2006 
decision and issued its 2007 opinion. It is possible to make some guesses about 
why the majority withdrew the 2006 opinion and issued the revised opinion. The 
2007 opinion reached the same holdings and order to the district court as the 
withdrawn 2006 opinion, so there was no reason to withdraw the 2006 for reasons 
relating to the ultimate remand and order to the district court. The discussion of 
justiciability and exhaustion are largely the same in both opinions except that the 
act of state section in the 2007 opinion does not decide whether the UNCLOS 
claim constituted customary international law.425 Yet, the most important 
difference is that the 2007 opinion avoided the contentious question of whether the 
plaintiffs' claims, especially the UNCLOS claims, were cognizable under the ATS 
by simply finding that the claims were serious enough to warrant jurisdiction and 
420 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1208, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1084. 
421 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1207, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1082-83. 
422 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1209-10, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1086. 
423 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1210, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1085-86. 
424 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1213, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1089. 
425 Compare Sarei III, 487 F.3d at 1210, with Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1085-86. 
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review by the district court.426 
It seems likely that the majority sought to avoid addressing the merits of 
whether at least some of the plaintiffs' claims constituted customary international 
law that is cognizable under the ATS. Interestingly, the court explicitly stated that 
"[p ]laintiffs here have alleged several claims asserting jus cogens violations that 
form the least controversial core of modem day A TCA jurisdiction, including 
allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and racial discrimination.'.427 
The only claim that does not clearly violate a jus cogens norm is the UNCLOS 
claim.428 It is possible that the majority withdrew the 2006 opinion because they 
believed that their conclusion in that opinion that UNCLOS constituted customary 
international law was controversial and might result in the Ninth Circuit granting 
the defendants' petition for en banc review. 
VI. FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS AFTER SOSA 
Although Sosa could have provided a clearer standard for which modem 
human rights norms are comparable to eighteenth-century norms such as piracy, 
most environmental law norms are too indefinite to meet even a broad reading of 
Sosa's requirement that modem international law principles must have a definite 
content comparable to eighteenth-century norms to be the basis for an A TS suit. In 
light of Sosa 's caution about allowing too many A TS suits, lower courts should 
generally allow A TS claims alleging serious human rights violations and reject 
purely environmental claims.429 Courts could, however, consider claims where 
alleged human rights abuses are intertwined with the alleged environmental 
harms.43o 
A. Internal Pollution Claims 
A TS claims that allege pollution in only the source country are unlikely to 
succeed unless there are allegations that the defendant intended to cause harm or 
that the human rights abuses are intertwined with the pollution activities. Courts 
have been reluctant to accept A TS claims based on allegations of internal pollution 
426 Sarei Ill, 487 F.3d at 1223. 
427 Id. at 1202. 
428Id. at 1210. 
429 One commentator has argued that even human rights offenses are too vague 
compared to piracy's "narrow and precise definition." Kontorovich, supra note 201, at 156. 
The problem with that argument is that Sosa favorably cited Filartiga, Judge Edwards' 
concurrence in Tel-Oren, and the Marcos litigation as examples of appropriate ATS cases 
and those cases all involved alleged human rights abuses. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
430 See Boeving, supra note 25, at 134 ("[I]t seems doubtful that purely environmental 
damage will become part of the law of nations anytime soon. Therefore, [the Sosa] decision 
signals to environmental plaintiffs that the human rights proxy approach is the most viable 
alternative and perhaps only route through which to pursue their claims."). 
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because international law, including the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, 
recognizes that nations have a right to exploit their own natural resources 
following their particular environmental policies.431 Courts have emphasized that 
American pollution standards cannot serve as the measure for what level of 
pollution is acceptable in other countries.432 Courts have rejected environmental 
A TS claims based on broad assertions that there is a fundamental international 
human "right to health," right to "sustainable development," or right to live in a 
clean and healthy environment, because there are no real limits or boundaries to 
such assertions.433 
If a plaintiff alleges that a defendant released environmental pollution with the 
deliberate purpose of causing serious harms to the plaintiff then courts should 
address that claim as a serious human rights violation comparable to genocide, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes.434 The district court in Beanal I suggested 
that extreme environmental injuries might constitute genocide if the defendant 
specifically intended to cause such destruction, but concluded that the plaintiffs 
vague allegations that the environmental harms constituted "cultural genocide" 
were insufficient and that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the defendant had 
caused the pollution with the specific purpose of destroying the Amungme 
group.435 In a case similar to Saddam Hussein's intentional destruction of oil wells 
in Kuwait that caused extensive fires and large-scale environmental devastation, a 
court might recognize a valid ATS claim for genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
war crimes, depending upon the defendant's motives, whether the incident 
occurred during a war or civil war, and the number of people harmed or killed by 
the incident.436 
For example, the Second Circuit in Flores II rejected a claim alleging that 
"egregious" intra-national pollution from the mining activities violated customary 
international environmental law because intra-national pollution, even if severe, is 
generally a concern of that particular nation alone and not a "mutual concern" of 
the international community at large.437 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Beanal III 
431 Rio Declaration, supra note 131, prine. 2 (stating nations have the "sovereign right 
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies"); Stockholm Declaration, supra note 104, prine. 21 (granting nations the 
"sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies"). 
432 See supra notes 146, 168-169 and accompanying text. 
433 See supra notes 150-160, 165-167,268-275 and accompanying text. 
434 Christensen, supra note 43, at 1252 ("Environmental abuses may be actionable, 
however, under the theory that they were committed in furtherance of genocide, war 
crimes, or crimes against humanity."). 
435 Beanal 1,969 F. Supp. 362,372-73 (E.D. La. 1997), ajJ'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
436 See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(discussing Saddam Hussein's destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells as example ofa violation of 
customary international law); see also Edgerton, supra note 258 (discussing whether 
Saddam Hussein's destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells violated international law). 
437 Flores IJ, 414 F.3d 233, 248-66 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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suggested that U.S. courts should not become involved in internal pollution issues 
because Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration contradicts such claims by recognizing 
that States have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and developmental policies.,,438 Thus, courts should 
generally reject internal pollution allegations as being sufficient to bring an A TS 
action. 
B. Transboundary Pollution Claims as Customary International Law 
Customary international law prohibits transboundary pollution that causes 
significant harm to other nations.439 The Restatement (Third) concludes that a State 
is obliged to "take all necessary measures, to the extent possible, to prevent 
activities within its jurisdiction or control from causing significant injury to the 
environment outside its jurisdiction.,,44o The Restatement (Third) also codifies the 
State's responsibility "for any significant injury, resulting from such violation, to 
the environment of areas beyond the limits ofnationaljurisdiction.,,441 
Even if there is a customary international law norm against harmful 
transboundary pollution, existing transboundary liability and compensation 
principles are too vague to meet Sosa's definiteness standard for ATS suits.442 For 
example, it is not clear whether traditional negligence or emerging strict liability 
principles of liability govern, and both standards require subjective judgments 
about which harms are "significant" enough to require compensation.443 
International courts or arbitration panels are better equipped to address the vague 
principles concerning transboundary liability than are federal courts. 
438 BeanalIII, 197 F.3d at 167 n.6. 
439 Abadie, supra note 90, at 775-78. 
440 Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 
1492, 1497 (1991) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 601-604 & introductory note (1987). 
441 Section 601(1) of the Restatement (Third) states: 
A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the 
extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its 
jurisdiction or control 
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for 
the prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of 
another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and 
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environment 
of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 601. 
442 See Developments in the Law, supra note 440, at 1508 ("The nuisance-like 
standard of the sic utere principle cannot a priori answer the crucial question of what level 
of environmental damage constitutes unacceptable damage, nor can it sufficiently describe 
what exercise of a state's rights causes unacceptable harm." (footnotes omitted». 
443 /d. at 1509-11. 
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Looking more closely at the issue, there are two types of transboundary 
pollution. First, pollution from any location may harm the global commons, 
including ocean pollution, ozone depletion, and global warming.444 Second, 
pollution from a source country may affect a receiving country's territory.445 Both 
types of trans boundary pollution in theory could violate customary international 
law or an MEA and thus either type could be actionable under the ATS.446 Still, 
both types of transboundary pollution claims raise too many questions unanswered 
by existing international law to be the basis for an A TS suit. 
A number of MEAs recognize that there is an international law norm against 
transboundary pollution that causes significant environmental harm and this norm 
is now a part of customary international law. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration of Principles grants nations the "sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies," but also imposes upon 
them "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.,,447 Principle 21 was adopted by a vote of 103 to 0, 
including the United States, with twelve abstentions by Soviet bloc nations and 
South Africa.448 The Stockholm Declaration is not binding upon its signatories, but 
Principle 21' s requirement that States have a responsibility to avoid transboundary 
pollution is now widely accepted as reflecting customary international law.449 
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration adopted identical language in proscribing 
transboundary harms.45o 
Stockholm Principle 22, however, weakened the responsibility requirement in 
Principle 21 by simply requiring that States "co-operate to develop further the 
international law regarding liability and compensation.,,451 Using somewhat 
stronger language than Stockholm Principle 22, Rio Principle 13 requires States to 
"cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop further 
international law regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of 
444 See Abadie, supra note 90, at 775 n.186; Alan Neff, Not In Their Backyards 
Either: A Proposal/or a Foreign Environmental Practices Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477, 480 
(1990). 
445 See Abadie, supra note 90, at 775 n.186; Neff, supra note 444, at 480. 
446 See Abadie, supra note 90, at 775 n.186. 
447 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 104, prine. 21. 
448 Abadie, supra note 90, at 778; see Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 433 (1973). 
449 Brian R. Popiel, From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment: A 
New Approach To Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage Between Canada and 
the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 447, 457 (1995); Developments in the Law, 
supra note 440, at 1497-98. 
450 Rio Declaration, supra note 131, prine. 2. 
451 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 104, prine. 22 ("States shall co-operate to 
develop further the international law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of 
pollution and other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or 
control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction."); see Developments in the Law, 
supra note 440, at 1508. 
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environmental damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to 
areas beyond their jurisdiction.,,452 As is discussed below, the United Nations 
International Law Commission has produced eight draft principles concerning 
transboundary liability, but the majority of nations have yet to endorse these 
principles and the principles are relatively vague.453 Even if Principle 21 is 
customary international law, there is a strong argument that it is too indefinite to 
enforce in an A TS suit because there is no clear or universally accepted definition 
of how much harm is necessary for an actionable violation or how to measure 
damages.454 
Several international court decisions or adjudications support the view that 
customary international law now requires an offending nation to compensate its 
neighbors for harms caused by transboundary pollution.455 The 1938 and 1941 
Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada held Canada liable 
for compensation to the United States for transboundary sulfur dioxide pollution 
from a smelter in British Columbia that traveled into the United States and 
damaged apple growers in Washington State.456 Based upon both international law 
and U.S. law, the 1941 arbitration panel concluded by issuing injunctive relief, 
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence 
and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.457 
Although the arbitration was only binding between the two parties and 
technically had no precedential value,458 the Trail Smelter decision's principle that 
States are liable for their transboundary pollution is now recognized as customary 
to 
!d. 
452 Rio Declaration, supra notel26, prine. 13. Rio Principle 13 further requires States 
develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of 
pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an 
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law 
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental 
damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond 
their jurisdiction. 
453 See infra notes 473-475 and accompanying text. 
454 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
455 See Abadie, supra note 90, at 776-77. 
456 The Trail Smelter Case, 1941 (U.S. v. Can.), 3 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938) 
(initial decision awarding damages), further proceedings, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 
(1941) (final decision issuing injunctive relief); see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 543-
50. 
457 Trail Smelter, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965 (final decision). 
458 Developments in the Law, supra note 440, at 1500. 
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international law. It was the genesis of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
and has been followed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).459 For purposes 
of an A TS suit, however, Trail Smelter's "serious consequence" standard is too 
vague to meet Sosa's definiteness standard. 
In the 1949 Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ held Albania responsible for damage 
to British warships from mines it had placed in Albanian waters.460 The Corfu 
Channel court stated that "every State[]" has an "obligation not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.,,461 
Additionally, in the 1957 Lac Lanoux Arbitration between France and Spain, the 
arbitration tribunal reaffirmed the Corfu Channel principle that a State has an 
obligation to consider the interests and respect the rights of another State, but the 
case primarily addressed the parties' treaty obligations regarding water rights.462 
The international community has recognized the Trail Smelter arbitration and the 
Corfu Channel case together as establishing a customary law principle of 
compensation for trans boundary harms, but neither case establishes liability 
principles that are definite enough for an A TS suit. 463 
Two cases involving nuclear weapons possibly suggest that customary 
international law imposes liability on a State that causes significant environmental 
harm to other nations, but neither case provides the definite standards needed for 
an ATS suit. First, in the 1973-74 Nuclear Tests Cases, Australia and New 
Zealand separately sought to enjoin France from conducting atmospheric nuclear 
tests in the Pacific Ocean over Mumroa Atoll in French Polynesia, which is several 
thousands of miles from Australia and New Zealand.464 Because France agreed to 
stop atmospheric testing and to use underground testing,465 the ICJ did not address 
the legality of the atmospheric testing and dismissed the case as moot. 466 In a 
459 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 542, 550 n.3; Developments in the Law, 
supra note 440, at 1497 n.30. 
460 See The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Apr. 9). 
461 !d. at 22. 
462 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R. Int'! Arb. Awards 281, 314-17 
(1957); see Abadie, supra note 90, at 777 (stating Lac Lanoux reaffinned the Corfu 
Channel principle that a state has an obligation to consider the interests and respect the 
rights of another state); Developments in the Law, supra note 440, at 1500 (arguing the Lac 
Lanoux arbitration tribunal was primarily concerned with interpreting "treaty obligations"). 
463 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 503-04; Edgerton, supra note 258, at 162 
n.74; Richard E. Levy, International Law and the Chernobyl Accident: Reflections on an 
Important but Imperfect System, 36 KAN. L. REv. 81,90, 100--01 (1987) (stating holdings 
of Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel express general principles of international law); 
Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, Global Warming and Climate Change-An Overview 
of the International Legal Process, 5 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 249,264 (1990) (stating 
that Trail Smelter case expresses principles of customary international law). 
464 Nuclear Tests Cases (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 254-56 (Dec. 20); see 
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 999. 
465 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 999. 
466 After the ICJ dismissed the case as moot, France withdrew from the ICJ's 
jurisdiction. Nuclear Tests Cases, 1974 I.e.}. at 255, 272; see HUNTER ET AL., supra note 
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dissenting opinion, Judge de Castro cited the Trail Smelter decision, and stated: 
If it is admitted as a general rule that there is a right to demand 
. prohibition of the emission by neighbouring properties of noxious fumes, 
the consequence must be drawn, by an obvious analogy, that the Applicant 
is entitled to ask the Court to uphold its claim that France should put an 
end to the deposit of radio-active fall-out on its territory.467 
While the dissenting opinion has no precedential value in itself, it provides some 
evidence that Trail Smelter's transboundary liability principles are widely 
followed. 
In 1996, the World Health Organization and the United Nations General 
Assembly asked the IeJ for an advisory opinion regarding whether international 
law permits the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances.468 By an 
eight to seven vote, the ICJ decided that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was 
generally contrary to the law of war's rules on armed conflict, but the court did not 
address whether a State could use such weapons as self-defense if its survival was 
at stake.469 The court also determined that existing environmental treaties are not 
"intended to deprive a State of the exercise of its right of self-defense under 
international law because of its obligations to protect the environment.'.470 The IeJ, 
however, recognized a general principle of international law prohibiting 
transboundary environmental harms, stating that "[t]he existence of the general 
obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control 
respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now 
part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.'.471 The ICJ's 
decisions technically do not create precedent, but they are widely followed by the 
international community. The IeJ's recognition that States have an obligation to 
avoid transboundary pollution suggests this principle is now part of customary 
international law, but the principle is too vague to serve as the basis of an ATS suit 
under the Sosa standard. 
Beginning in 1978 and continuing to the present, the United Nations' 
International Law Commission has appointed special rapporteurs to develop 
principles for transboundary liability.472 In June 2006, the Commission adopted a 
65, at 999; Abadie, supra note 90, at 777. 
467 See Nuclear Tests Cases, 1974I.C.J. at 389 (de Castro, 1., dissenting). 
468 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.e.J. 226 (July 8); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 1000, 1461-64. 
469 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 468, ~~ 53-58; 
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 1000 (analyzing whether nuclear weapons should be 
prohibited). 
470 Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 468, ~~ 30,33; see 
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 504. 
471 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 468, ~ 29; see 
HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 504. 
472 Int'I Law Comm'n, Report of the Working Group on Int'I Liab. for Injurious 
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preamble and a set of eight draft principles on the "allocation of loss in the case of 
transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities and in August 2006 adopted 
commentaries to those same draft principles.473 In August 2006, the Commission 
recommended that the U.N. General Assembly "endorse the draft principles by a 
resolution and urge States to take national and international action to implement 
them. ,,474 In December 2006, the General Assembly without a vote approved a 
draft resolution that took note of the eight draft principles, "commends them to the 
attention of Governments," and placed them on the provisional agenda for its next 
session. This formulaic response by the General Assembly is a neutral response 
that does not constitute an endorsement of the draft principles.475 
In the Preamble, the draft principles "Reaffirm[]" the liability and 
compensation norms in Principles 13 and 16476 of the Rio Declaration.477 Draft 
Principle 1 declares that "[t]he present draft principles apply to transboundary 
damage caused by hazardous activities not prohibited by international law.,,478 
Principle 2(a) explains that '''damage' means significant damage caused to 
persons, property or the environment.,,479 Principle 2(c) defines "hazardous 
Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by InCI Law, ml51-57, 59, 64--65, U.N. 
GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc A611l0 (Supp) (May I-June 9 & Jui. 3-Aug. 
11, 2006) [hereinafter Int'l Liab. Comm'n Report], available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilcl 
reports/2006/english/chp5.pdf; see Developments in the Law, supra note 440, at 1499 n.42. 
473 Int'l Liab. Comm'n Report, supra note 472, '\1'\160-61. 
4741d. '\163. 
475 Take note of the principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary 
hann arising out of hazardous activities, presented by the Commission, the text of which is 
annexed to the present resolution, and commends them to the attention of Governments. 
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Hann Arising Out of Hazardous 
Activities, G.A. Res. 61/36, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/36/Annex (Dec. 18, 2006). See 
Press Release, General Assembly, Considering Sixth Committee Reports, Adopts Text on 
Criminal Accountability of U.N. Officials, Experts on Mission (Dec. 4, 2006), 
http://www.un.orgiNewslPress/docs/2006/gal0544.doc.htm. 
476 "National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach 
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the 
public interest and without distorting international trade and investment." Rio Declaration, 
supra note 131, princ. 16. 
477 Int'l Liab. Comm'n Report, supra note 472, '\166. 
4781d. 
4791d. Principle 2(a) lists the following types of damage: 
(i) loss of life or personal injury; 
(ii) loss of, or damage to, property, including property which fonns part of the 
cultural heritage; 
. (iii) loss or damage by impainnent of the environment; 
(iv) the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement of the property, or 
environment, including natural resources; 
(v) the costs of reasonable response measures. 
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activity" as "an activity which involves a risk of causing significant harm." 
Principle 3 defines the compensatory purposes of the draft principles.480 Principle 
4(1) recommends that each State "should" provide compensation to victims of 
transboundary harm.481 Principle 4(2) encourages a strict liability regime, declaring 
that "[t]hese measures should include the imposition of liability on the operator or, 
where appropriate, other person or entity. Such liability should not require proof of 
fault. ,,482 Principle 6(1) requires the State causing the transboundary harm to 
provide domestic judicial and domestic remedies for victims.483 Principle 7 
recommends that States "should" make "all efforts" to develop global, regional or 
bilateral agreements on transboundary liability and responses.484 Principle 8 
recommends that "[e]ach State should adopt the necessary legislative, regulatory 
and administrative measures to implement the present draft principles.,,485 
The draft principles are not themselves binding but are suggestive of trends in 
international law. A key question is whether the draft principles reflect a universal, 
mandatory, and definite international consensus about providing compensation to 
victims of transboundary harms. The Commission's adoption of the draft 
principles suggests that there could be broad support for these principles, but it will 
not be known whether that support is universal until the General Assembly votes to 
accept the principles. From the perspective of an A TS suit, a problem with the 
draft principles is that they use the hortatory term "should" in several key liability 
principles rather than the mandatory shall. The use of the term "should" means 
they are not obligatory and hence are not enforceable in an A TS suit. 
Another issue is whether the term "significant damage" is definite enough for 
an A TS suit. The commentary to Principle 2 states: 
Id. 
480 Id. princ. 3. Principle 3 defines the compensatory purposes as "(a) to ensure 
prompt and adequate compensation to victims of transboundary damage; and (b) to 
preserve and protect the environment in the event of transboundary damage, especially 
with respect to mitigation of damage to the environment and its restoration or 
reinstatement." /d. 
481 /d. princ. 4(1) ("Each State should take all necessary measures to ensure that 
prompt and adequate compensation is available for victims of transboundary damage 
caused by hazardous activities located within its territory or otherwise under its jurisdiction 
or control."). 
482Id. princ. 4(2). 
483 Id. princ. 6(1) ("States shall provide their domestic judicial and administrative 
bodies with the necessary jurisdiction and competence and ensure that these bodies have 
prompt, adequate and effective remedies available in the event of transboundary damage 
caused by hazardous activities located within their territory or otherwise under their 
jurisdiction or control."). 
484 Id. princ. 7 ("Where, in respect of particular categories of hazardous activities, 
specific global, regional or bilateral agreements would provide effective arrangements 
concerning compensation, response measures and international and domestic remedies, all 
efforts should be made to conclude such specific agreements."). 
485Id. princ. 8(1). 
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The tenn "significant" is understood to refer to something more than 
"detectable" but need not be at the level of "serious" or "substantial". 
The hann must lead to a real detrimental effect on matters such as, for 
example, human health, industry, property, environment or agriculture in 
other States. Such detrimental effects must be susceptible of being 
measured by factual and objective standards.486 
The commentary also acknowledges that deciding what is significant damage 
involves a case-by-case detennination. 
The detennination of "significant damage" involves both factual and objective 
criteria, and a value detennination. The latter is dependent on the circumstances of 
a particular case and the period in which it is made. For instance, a deprivation 
which is considered significant in one region may not necessarily be so in another. 
A certain deprivation at a particular time might not be considered "significant" 
because scientific knowledge or human appreciation at that specific time might 
have considered such deprivation tolerable. However, that view might later change 
and the same deprivation might then be considered significant damage. "For 
instance, the sensitivity of the international community to air and water pollution 
levels has been constantly undergoing change.,,487 
The commentary provides an extensive discussion of what constitutes 
significant transboundary hann and related issues for a total of thirty-four 
paragraphs.488 This discussion is comparable to the guidance a U.S. court might 
find in a statute's legislative history or an EPA rule, but the commentary fails to 
provide definite standards because it recognizes that scientific knowledge about the 
environment is evolving, there are regional differences in how pollution affects the 
environment, and that many different types of potentially hazardous substances 
exist. 
Even if there is a universal and obligatory duty in customary international law 
on the part of States to avoid trans boundary pollution harming other States or 
areas, that duty is not sufficiently specific or definable to be enforced through the 
A TS. According to an environmental law casebook by American scholars, "The 
duty to prevent transboundary hann is not absolute," but instead requires States "to 
use due diligence in taking all practicable steps.,,489 A duty to exercise such "due 
diligence" is not sufficiently concrete to be enforceable under the A TS. Because of 
environmental law's inherent complexities, customary international law 
prohibiting significant transboundary hann is far less definite than the eighteenth-
century customary law that defines the standard in Sosa. Accordingly, courts 
should reject A TS claims alleging transboundary hanns. 
C. UNCLOS 
486/d. prine. 2, emt. (footnote omitted). 
487/d. 
488 I d. 
489 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 506 n.5. 
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1. Introduction to UNCLOS Part Xll 
A weakness of both the district court's decision and the court of appeals' 
withdrawn 2006 opinion in Sarei is that neither opinion addressed UNCLOS' 
specific provisions. This Section examines UNCLOS' marine pollution provisions 
in detail. It concludes that they are too indefinite to serve as the basis of an A TS 
suit.. 
Beginning in 1973 and concluding in 1982, the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea sought to update the work of the 1958 Geneva 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and address emerging topics such as marine 
pollution that had been given limited attention in the past.490 UNCLOS III consists 
of 320 articles divided in seventeen parts and nine annexes.491 UNCLOS was 
opened for signature in 1982 and came into force in 1994.492 As of November 
2006, 155 States had ratified UNCLOS.493 Many scholars believe that because so 
many nations have ratified it that it now has become customary law that is binding 
even on those nations that have not signed it, including the United States.494 Even 
if it codifies customary international law, UNCLOS marine pollution provisions 
are too indefinite to be enforceable in an A TS suit.495 Furthermore, Professor Knox 
argues that these provisions could not have been customary international law 
during the 1970s and 1980s when the mine created most of the pollution because 
UNCLOS had not yet entered into force.496 
Part XII of UNCLOS addresses marine pollution in Articles 192 through 
490 See Alan E. Boyle, Marine Pollution Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 79 
AM. J. INT'L. L. 347, 347--49 (1985). 
491 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 739; UNCLOS, supra note 5. 
492 HUNTER ET AL., supra note 65, at 739; International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html(follow "General Information-States Parties" 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 30, 2007) [hereinafter ITLOS]. 
493 ITLOS, supra note 492. 
494 See, e.g., Mary Gray Davidson, Protecting Coral Reefs: The Principal National 
and International Legal Instruments, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 499, 528-29 (2002); 
Jonathan L. Hafetz, Fostering Protection of the Marine Environment and Economic 
Development: Article 121(3) of the Third Law of the Sea Convention, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REv. 583, 597 (1999); Suzanne Iudicello & Margaret Lytle, Marine Biodiversity and 
International Law: Instruments and Institutions That Can Be Used to Conserve Marine 
Biological Diversity Internationally, 8 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 123, 132 (1994) ("Many experts 
have agreed that 'UNCLOS is not only a treaty but a codification and articulation of the 
present state of the rules applicable to the oceans,' and, as such, is binding on both 
signatories and nonsignatories as customary international law." (quoting John P. Wise, 
Federal Conservation and Management of Marine Fisheries in the United States, Center 
For Marine Conservation, 1991, at 109-10». 
495 See generally Knox, supra note 354 (suggesting that UNCLOS Articles 194 and 
207 are too indefinite to meet the Sosa definiteness standard). 
496 Knox, supra note 354. 
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236.497 Article 192, entitled "General Obligation," declares that "States have the 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.,,498 Article 193 
recognizes that "States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources 
pursuant to their environmental policies," but limits that right of exploitation "in 
accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.,,499 The 
state obligations in Articles 192 and 193 are simply too general and vague to meet 
Sosa's definite content standard. 
Article 206, entitled "Assessment of potential effects of activities," establishes 
a vague duty on the part of States to conduct an environmental impact assessment 
on some proposed activities within their jurisdiction. It declares that "[ w ]hen States 
have reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities under their 
jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution of or significant and harmful 
changes to the marine environment, they shall, as far as practicable, ass~ss the 
potential effects of such activities on the marine environment."soo Article 206 does 
not provide any detailed standards to decide the threshold issue of whether a 
proposed project may involve "substantial pollution of or significant and harmful 
changes to the marine environment."SOI Nor does it specify the issues that such an 
assessment should address.so2 Thus, Article 206 is too general and vague to meet 
Sosa 's definite content standard. 
2. Article 194: Controlling Marine Pollution and Transboundary Pollution 
Article 194 sets forth the general responsibility of States to adopt "[m]easures 
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment."so3 
Specifically, Article 194( 1) provides: 
States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures 
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce, and 
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for 
497 See Boyle, supra note 490, at 350 ("[P]art XII of the Convention represent[s] the 
first attempt to set out a general framework for a legal regime that establishes on a global, 
conventional basis the obligations, responsibilities and powers of states in all matters of 
marine environmental protection."); Jonathan I. Charney, The Marine Environment and the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 28 INT'L LAW. 879, 883-93 
(1994). 
498 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 192. 
499Id. art. 193; see Charney, supra note 497, at 886. 
500 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 206; see Maki Tanaka, Lessons from the Protracted 
MOX Plant Dispute: A Proposed Protocol on Marine Environmental Impact Assessment to 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 25 Mich. J. Int'l L. 337, 356 (2004) 
("[A]rticle 206 is quite vague. This provision fails to identify which state should be 
responsible for assessing the impacts of an activity that falls under concurrent jurisdiction 
of several states."). 
501 Tanaka, supra note 500, at 393 (quoting UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 206). 
502 See Tanaka, supra note 500, at 356. 
503 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 194 (title of article 194). 
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this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in 
accordance with their capabilities, and they shall endeavor to hannonize 
their policies in this connection.504 
The tenn "pollution of the marine environment" is defined in Article 1(4).505 
1157 
Article 194(1) declares that States have a duty to take "all measures" to 
reduce marine pollution, but weakens that requirement by including the two 
qualifying tenns "best practicable means" and "in accordance with their 
capabilities.,,506 This qualifying language gives States "wide discretion" in 
deciding how to fulfill their obligations under Article 194.507 Because it gives 
States significant discretion in detennining their obligation to reduce marine 
pollution, Article 194 is too indefinite to serve as the basis of an A TS suit. 
The "best practicable means" standard is possibly specific enough to enforce 
in an A TS suit, but the "in accordance with their capabilities" qualification is 
clearly too indefinite to serve as the basis for an A TS suit. Article 194' s "best 
practicable means" standard is arguably definite enough for an A TS suit because a 
plaintiff could introduce expert opinion regarding the best technology for 
controlling marine pollution. The U.S. Clean Water Act uses a similar "best 
practicable technology" (BPT) standard for establishing technology standards for 
regulating water pollution for various industrial categories and subcategories.508 
The Act's legislative history, however, provided some guidance to the courts and 
the EPA in defining BPT.509 On the other hand, because UNCLOS does not 
Id. 
504 Id. art. 194(1). 
505 Id. art. 1(4). Article 1(4) defines "pollution of the marine environment as 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in 
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to 
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities. 
506 Id. art. 194( 1). 
507 Dr. Daud Hassan, International Conventions Relating to Land-Based Sources of 
Marine Pollution Control: Applications and Shortcomings, 16 GEO INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 
657, 670 (2004); accord William C. G. Burns, Potential Causes of Action for Climate 
Change Damages in International Fora: The Law of the Sea Convention, 2 INT'L 1. 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'y 27, 46 (2006). 
508 See 33 U.S.c. §§ 1311(b)(I)(A), 1314(b)(I)(A)-(B) (2006). 
509 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 131 n.21 (1977) 
(holding BPT standards are based upon the average of the best existing performers in an 
industrial category or subcategory); Kennecott v. EPA, 780 F.2d 445, 448 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(same); Am. Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); 118 CONGo REC. 
33,696 (1972) (statement of Senator Muskie) ("The Administrator [of EPA] should 
establish the range of 'best practicable' levels based on the average of the best existing 
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provide a clear definition of the "best practicable means" standard, it is arguably 
too vague because different nations could disagree about what IS the best 
technology for reducing a particular type of pollution. 510 
The "accordance with their capabilities" language in 194(1) is also too 
indefinite to be enforceable in an A TS suit because it requires a court to consider 
the state party's level of affluence compared to other nations, but provides no 
standards for taking into account a nation's relative wealth. Article 194( 1) suggests 
a different degree of pollution control would be expected in the affluent United 
States than the relatively poor Papua New Guinea, but does not explain how much 
less is expected of Papua New Guinea.511 One commentator criticizes Article 
194(1) by observing that it allows States to claim that they are doing everything 
possible when "they are capable of doing more.,,512 On the other hand, Professor 
Charney argues that the qualification is limited because "[i]t is available only if the 
state actually does not have better means at its disposal.,,513 Following Professor 
Charney'S interpretation of Article 194, a plaintiff might allege that a defendant 
could have afforded better pollution control methods even conceding its relative 
poverty. Yet even under Professor Charney's interpretation, a court would have to 
decide whether a State acted in good faith in addressing pollution problems and 
judging good faith is an inherently subjective evaluation. For example, if a State 
argued that it was more important for it to spend its income on health care or 
national defense than pollution control, an American court would likely dismiss the 
case on act of state or international comity grounds because it would be 
inappropriate for an American court to second guess the priorities of a sovereign 
foreign nation. 
Additionally, in an ATS suit, it is not clear whether a court applying Article 
194(1) would focus on Papua New Guinea's economic status or the economic 
capabilities of defendant Rio Tinto. Because scholars have not interpreted Article 
194(1) in the same way and there are no international decisions interpreting its 
provisions, a federal court could reasonably conclude that the Article is too 
indefinite to apply in an A TS suit even though it clearly represents customary 
performance by plants of various sizes, ages, and unit processes within each industrial 
category."); 40 C.F.R. § 125 (2006) (defining BPT as "the average of the best existing 
performance by plants of various sizes, ages and unit processes within each industrial 
category or subcategory"). 
510 See Burns, supra note 507, at 46-47; Hassan, supra note 507, at 670-71. 
511 See Charney, supra note 497, at 886 ("[I]n theory, a less developed country with 
limited capabilities may not be required to take as costly or sophisticated steps as a highly 
developed state. Arguably, this qualification introduces a double standard for marine 
environment protection."); Hassan, supra note 507, at 670 ("The insertion of those words 
gives a license of reluctance to states in relation to their responsibility for taking adequate 
measures for LBSMP [(Land-based Sources of Marine Pollution)] control, since the 
assessment of pollution control depends entirely on their capability to do so."). 
512 Elizabeth Kirk, International Law and Developing States: Lessons from Vietnam, 8 
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 263,266 n.l8 (1996). 
5I3 Charney, supra note 497, at 886. 
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international law because ofUNCLOS's wide adoption. 
Under 194(2) there is a mandatory duty for States to avoid transboundary 
pollution, but there are still many unanswered questions about the extent of that 
duty. 
States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activIties 
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause 
damage by pollution to other States and their environment, and that 
pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or 
control does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign 
rights in accordance with this Convention.514 
According to one commentator, Section 194(2) establishes "an absolute 
prohibition and is not modified by the particular development condition of the state 
concerned.,,515 On the other hand, the same commentator concedes that "UNCLOS 
does not specify the exact nature of measures to be implemented.,,516 Section 
194(2) does not contain the qualifications in Article 194(1), but could be 
interpreted to incorporate by reference the limitations in Article 194( 1).517 Nor 
does Article 194(2) explain "the requisite type and degree of harm" to the 
environment sufficient to constitute a violation.518 Thus, Article 194(2) is too 
indefinite to serve as the basis of an A TS suit. 
Article 194(3) makes it clear that States have a duty to address all sources of 
marine pollution, whether from land, air pollution or vessels, especially 
"persistent" forms of "toxic, harmful or noxious substances." Article 194(3) states: 
(3) The measures taken pursuant to this Part shall deal with all sources 
of pollution of the marine environment. These measures shall 
include, inter alia, those designed to minimise to the fullest possible 
extent: 
(a) the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially 
those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or 
through the atmosphere or by dumping .... 519 
UNCLOS, however, fails to specify which substances are toxic, harmful, or 
noxious and therefore allows States significant discretion in deciding which 
substances should be regulated.52o Accordingly, Article 194(3) is too indefinite to 
514 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 194(2). 
515 Kirk, supra note 512, at 266. 
516 Id. 
517 See Mark Allan Gray, The International Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.I. 
215,242 (1996). 
518Id. at 243--44. 
519 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 194(3). 
520 See Hassan, supra note 507, at 668--{j9 (discussing similar provision in Article 
207(5)). 
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serve as the basis of an A TS suit. 
3. Articles 207 and 213: Land-Based Pollution 
The UNCLOS provisions for controlling land-based pollution are much 
weaker than those controlling vessel pollution, dumping, or seabed installation. 52 I 
Article 207(1) requires States to "adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources ... taking 
into account internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices 
and procedures," but it does not provide specific measures for States to adopt.522 
Boyle has criticized the "taking into account language" because "[i]t leaves states 
very wide discretion to adopt their own laws and is in effect a power to set national 
standards uncontrolled by any internationally agreed criteria."m Thus, Article 
207(1) is too indefinite to serve as the basis of an ATS suit. 
Additionally, Article 207(3) requires States to "endeavour to harmonize their 
policies in this connection at the appropriate regional level.,,524 The term 
"endeavour" is far from mandatory and suggests that any alleged good faith effort 
is enough.525 Article 207 has led some regions to adopt regional agreements that 
are arguably more stringent than UNCLOS, but the extent of the duty to do so is 
far from clear.526 Therefore, Article 207(3) is too indefinite to serve as the basis of 
521 See Boyle, supra note 490, at 353-54; Hassan, supra note 507, at 668 ("Unlike 
articles dealing with pollution from ships, dumping or seabed installations, Article 207 
does not require adherence to any minimum international standards established by 
international organizations."); Tanaka, supra note 500, at 352 ("[T]he language [for land-
based sources] is quite lenient compared with the [vessel pollution] provisions"). But see 
John Warren Kindt, Solid Wastes and Marine Pollution, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 37, 97 (1984) 
("Perhaps because land-based pollutants have been recognized as the major cause of ocean 
degradation, marine pollution via land-based sources received prioritized treatment in the 
LOS Convention."). Kindt acknowledges that "[t]he provisions regulating vessel-source 
pollution are more extensive than those governing land-based pollution; however, this 
development occurred because of the extensive jurisdictional questions (particularly with 
regard to the economic zone) that arose during the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea." !d. at 97 n.443. 
522 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 207(1) ("States shall adopt laws and regulations to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, 
including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and outfall structures, taking into account 
internationally agreed rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures."); see 
Boyle, supra note 490, at 354; Kirk, supra note 512, at 266. 
523 Boyle, supra note 490, at 354; accord Tanaka, supra note 500, at 352 (stating that 
under Article 207, "domestic standards can be lower than international standards"). 
524 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 207(3). 
525 Hassan, supra note 507, at 668 ("In article 207, vague or imprecise language is 
used in relation to the obligation of states to 'endeavour to harmonise their policies at the 
appropriate regional level' .... " (quoting UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 207(3))). 
526 See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention]; Tanaka, 
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an ATS suit. 
Article 207(4) also declares that States "shall endeavour" to develop global 
and regional rules addressing land-based pollution, but allows those regulations to 
"tak[ e] into account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of 
developing States and their need for economic development.,,527 The qualifications 
in Article 207(4) allow a State to minimize their obligations to reduce land-based 
pollution by arguing that standards are low in their region, that they are a 
developing country too poor to afford adequate pollution control measures, or that 
their need for economic development outweighs the harm of the pollution.528 
Accordingly, Article 207(4) is too indefinite to serve as the basis of an ATS suit. 
Article 207(5) requires States "to minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the 
release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, especially those which are 
persistent, into the marine environment.,,529 UNCLOS, however, does not define 
which substances are toxic, harmful, or noxious. It gives States discretion in 
deciding which substances to regulate.530 Thus, Article 207(5) is too indefinite to 
serve as the basis of an A TS suit. 
Dr. Hassan criticizes Article 207 for failing to "indicate what internationally 
agreed upon rules and standards are, and what 'other measures' States must take 
into account. Further, it fails to give any indication as to the criteria to determine 
the suitability of the above standards and measures.,,531 He criticizes the provisions 
in Article 207 for being "too general" and for "not requir[ing] adherence to any 
minimum international standards established by international organizations.532 He 
supra note 500, at 352-53. 
Id. 
527 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 207(4). Article 207(4) requires, 
States, acting especially through competent international organizations or 
diplomatic conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and 
control pollution of the marine environment from land-based sources, taking 
into account characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of 
developing States and their need for economic development. Such rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be reexamined from 
time to time as necessary. 
528 See David M. Dzidzornu, Coastal State Obligations and Powers Respecting EEZ 
Environmental Protection Under Part XII of the UNCLOS: A Descriptive Analysis, 8 
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 283,293 (1997) ("This expectation [of controlling land-
based pollution] is limited, however, by the fact that participants must take into account 
characteristic regional environmental conditions and the economic capacity and 
developmental needs of any developing countries in a region when establishing criteria and 
standards."). 
529 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 207(5). 
530 Hassan, supra note 511, at 668-69. 
531 Id. at 668. 
532 Id. 
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concludes that "the obligation [in Article 207] is so imprecisely and broadly 
formulated as to not have much of a practical effect.,,533 Such an imprecise 
standard clearly fails to meet the definite content standard in Sosa. 
Article 213 requires States to "enforce their laws and regulations adopted in 
accordance with article 207" and to "adopt laws and regulations and take other 
measures necessary to implement applicable international rules and standards 
established through competent international organizations or diplomatic 
conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment 
from land-based sources.,,534 Because of the qualifications in Article 207, one 
commentator argues that the duty of States to enforce Articles 207 and 213 "rests 
on each country's desire to exert a good faith regulatory effort.,,535 This imprecise 
standard makes Article 213 too indefinite to serve as the basis of an A TS suit. 
4. Article 235: Responsibility and Liability 
Article 235(1) holds States "responsible for the fulfillment of their 
international obligations concerning the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment," and declares that "[t]hey shall be liable in accordance with 
international law.,,536 Article 235 does not provide a clear definition of how to 
measure liability. Boyle suggests that "Article 235 seems to contemplate the novel 
possibility of state responsibility for causing damage to the marine environment 
unconnected to loss or damage to the interests or environment of other states.,,537 
He criticizes this broad approach to liability for going beyond Trail Smelter's 
approach of measuring damages based on the amount of harm trans boundary 
pollution causes another State because it raises difficult questions.538 He argues 
that UNCLOS fails to explain how such damages would be measured and who 
would collect them.539 He contends that "further development in state practice will 
be needed if effect is to be given to these still rather general principles.,,54o Such 
general liability principles are too indefinite for proper enforcement in an A TS 
suit. 
Additionally, Article 235(2) requires States to "ensure that recourse is 
available in accordance with their legal systems for prompt and adequate 
compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the 
marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.,,541 
Boyle criticizes Article 235(2) because "there is no attempt to prescribe any 
533/d. 
534 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 213. 
535 Kindt, supra note 521, at 98. 
536 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 235(1). 




541 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 235(2). 
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detailed principles of liability or to provide for specific sources of pollution.,,542 
The absence of detailed liability principles in Article 235 raises serious questions 
whether federal courts should allow UNCLOS to serve as the basis of an A TS 
action. 
Part XV of UNCLOS provides for four possible fora for the compulsory 
adjudication of disputes: (1) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), which is comprised of 21 judges and is established under Annex VI of 
the Convention; (2) the International Court of Justice; (3) an arbitral panel 
established under Annex VII of the Convention; or (4) a special arbitral panel for 
disputes falling into several specialized categories established under Annex VIII of 
the Convention.543 Most of the ITLOS' decisions have involved requests for the 
"prompt release" of a vessel seized by a foreign nation or provisional measures in 
cases not yet decided on the merits. 544 
5. The MOX Case 
There has been one major transboundary pollution dispute under UNCLOS. In 
2001, Ireland brought arbitration proceedings against the Unitec Kingdom under 
Article 287545 and Annex vn546 of UNCLOS.547 Ireland alleged that the United 
Kingdom was breaching its obligation to cooperate under Articles 123548 and 
542 Boyle, supra note 490, at 368. 
543 UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 287 & annexes VI-VIII; see Bums, supra note 507, at 
38; see Christoph Schwarte, Environmental Concerns in the Adjudication of the 
International Tribunalfor the Law of the Sea, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 421,423-24 
(2004) (discussing ITLOS). The jurisdiction of special arbitration panels under Annex VIII 
includes "( 1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the marine environment, (3) 
marine scientific research, or (4) navigation, including pollution from vessels and by 
dumping .... " UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. I, annex VIII. 
544 See e.g., ITLOS, List of Cases, at http://www.itlos.orglstart2_en.html(last visited 
Oct. 2, 2007); Schwarte, supra note 543, at 424-39. 
545 UNCLOS Article 287(1) declares in part, "a State shall be free to choose, by 
means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention: ... (c) an arbitral 
tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII." UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 287. 
546 UNCLOS Annex VII specifies arbitration procedures for UNCLOS cases. Id. 
annex VII. 
547 In the Dispute Concerning the MOX Plant, International Movements of 
Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish Sea 
Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case of Ireland (Ir. v. U.K.), 2001 
ITLOS 10, ~ I (Int'I Trib. L. of the Sea Nov. 9, 2001), available at http://www.itios.org/ 
case_documents/2001ldocument_en_191.pdf [hereinafter MOX Plant Case]; see Oren 
Perez, Reflections on an Environmental Struggle: P&O, Dahanu, and the Regulation of 
Multinational Enterprises, 15 Geo. Int'1 Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 18 n.87 (2002); Tanaka, supra 
note 500, at 381. 
548 Article 123 states: 
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197,549 its duty to prevent marine pollution under Part xn550 of the Convention, 
and had failed to assess environmental impacts under Article 206 when the United 
Kingdom built a nuclear reprocessing facility in Cumbria, on the coast of the Irish 
Sea.55t The plant would reprocess spent nuclear fuel into a new fuel, known as 
mixed oxide fuel, also referred to as MOX.552 The distance between the nuclear 
site and the Irish coast at its closest point is about 112 miles, both States claimed 
200-mile exclusive economic zones over the Irish Sea, and European Commission 
law authorizes Irish vessels to fish within 6 miles of the site.553 Ireland requested 
provisional measures under Article 290(5i54 from the International Tribunal Law 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to prevent or limit the operation of the new MOX 
plant and to freeze the transport of radioactive materials associated with the MOX 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate with each 
other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties under 
this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, directly or through an 
appropriate regional organization: . . . (b) to coordinate the implementation of 
their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment; .... 
UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 123. 
549 Article 197 states: 
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, 
directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and 
elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features. 
Id. art. 197. 
550 Ireland argued that the United Kingdom had violated Articles 192, 193, 194,207, 
211, and 213. 
551 MOX Plant Case, supra note 547, ~ 55-96; see Hassan, supra note 511, at 672; 
Perez, supra note 547, at 18 n.87; Tanaka, supra note 500, at 38l. 
552 MOX Plant Case, supra note 547, ~ 7-8. 
553 MOX Plant Case, supra note 547, ~ 5; see Tanaka, supra note 500, at 36l. 
554 Article 290(5) states: 
Pending the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to which a dispute is being 
submitted under this section, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, 
failing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for 
provisional measures, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or, with 
respect to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, may prescribe, 
modify or revoke provisional measures in accordance with this article if it 
considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would have 
jurisdiction and that the urgency of the situation so requires. 
UNCLOS, supra note 5, art. 290(5). 
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plant.555 
ITLOS agreed with Ireland that the Annex VII tribunal had jurisdiction over 
the dispute, but rejected the provisional measures requested by Ireland because it 
agreed with the United Kingdom that the harms were not urgent in light of the 
United Kingdom's promises that there would be no additional marine transports of 
radioactive material for the plant's operation and no export of MOX fuel until 
October 2002.556 Instead, ITLOS provisionally ordered the parties to work together 
on information exchange, monitoring, and pollution prevention measures 
concerning the operation of the MOX plant and to each issue reports on these 
actions by December 17, 2001.557 The decision appeared to be a political 
compromise between the United Kingdom's sovereign right to conduct economic 
activities on its soil, including nuclear processing, and Ireland's legitimate desire 
for more information about the MOX plant. 558 Because UNCLOS's Part XII 
provisions are so general, the tribunal issued a vague decision calling for 
cooperation that failed to specify how the parties were to share information or 
cooperate.559 
During 2003, the Annex VII tribunal was scheduled to hear the case on the 
merits, but it suspended its proceedings when the European Commission objected 
that the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the case.560 Although not hearing the case on the merits, the 
tribunal affirmed ITLOS's provisional measures, promulgated supplemental 
provisional measures recommending that the parties establish an effective 
intergovernmental mechanism for notification and coordination, and ordered them 
to submit reports on their compliance with the provisional measures. 56! Despite the 
orders to cooperate, the parties strongly disagreed about whether each was 
providing sufficient information and cooperation.562 
On May 30, 2006, the ECJ held that Ireland should have sued in its court 
instead of in the United Nation's arbitration system for UNCLOS because the ECJ 
had exclusive jurisdiction over transboundary pollution disputes within the 
European Community, including those that violate UNCLOS.563 The European 
555 MOX Plant Case, supra note 547, mr 122-150; see Hassan, supra note 511, at 672; 
Perez, supra note 547, at 18 n.87; Tanaka, supra note 500, at 381. 
556 Order of Dec. 3, MOX Plant Case (Ir. v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405, 414-16 (Int'I Trib. 
L. of the Sea 2001), available at http://www.itlos.orglstart23n.htm1(follow "Proceedings 
and Judgments," "List of Cases," "Case No. 10," and "Order of 3 December 2001" 
hyperlinks) [hereinafter MOX Plant Order]; see Hassan, supra note 511, at 672; Schwarte, 
supra note 543, at 434; Tanaka, supra note 500, at 383. 
557 MOX Plant Order, supra note 556, 41 I.L.M. at 416; see Hassan, supra note 511, 
at 672-73; Schwarte, supra note 543, at 435; Tanaka, supra note 500, at 383. 
558 See Schwarte, supra note 543, at 435; Tanaka, supra note 500, at 384. 
559 See Schwarte, supra note 543, at 435; Tanaka, supra note 500, at 384. 
560 See Tanaka, supra note 500 at 390-91. 
56! Id. at 392. 
562/d. at 384 n.260, 392, 395. 
563 Case C-459/03, Comm'n v. Ir., 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 238 (2006), available at 
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Union is a party to UNCLOS, as are all States belonging to the EU.564 Ireland 
could seek to sue the United Kingdom for violating UNCLOS before the ECJ.565 
Although it was cut short before a final decision, the MOX case demonstrates 
the complexities of UNCLOS and its arbitration system. Assuming UNCLOS 
codifies customary international law concerning transboundary pollution, the 
UNCLOS provisions in Part XII for preventing or regulating transboundary 
pollution are vague and difficult to apply. Even if it had reached the merits of the 
case, the Annex VII tribunal would have faced very difficult issues in balancing 
the United Kingdom's sovereign right to exploit its natural resources, including 
nuclear fuel, and Ireland's legitimate interest in protecting the Irish Sea. Factually, 
the issue whether the MOX plant was causing harm was far more complicated than 
the Trail Smelter case.566 
One must seriously question whether American courts are suited to addressing 
complicated trans boundary pollution issues in an ATS suit. In the relatively 
uncomplicated Sarei case, which involved only one polluter, a court would face 
complicated questions in determining how to measure damages to marine seas, 
including the Pacific Ocean.567 There has been a vigorous debate about whether 
American courts should even address the global problem of climate change 
because of difficult standing issues involving individual harm, causation, and the 
capacity of federal courts to remedy the situation.568 In Connecticut v. American 
http://europa.eu.intJeur-lexilexiRECH_recueil.do (type "2006" in Year field and "04635" 
in Page number field, then click "Search"). 
564 Id. ~~ 2-17. 
565 Id. ~~ 126, 138; see Jamie Smyth, Ireland Acted 'Illegally' by Bringing Sellajield 
Case to UN, THE IRISH TiMES, May 31, 2006, at 4 (reporting Ireland's Environment 
Minister Dick Roche stated that Ireland could sue United Kingdom in the European Court 
of Justice to stop the MOX plant). 
566 MOX Plant Order, supra note 556, 41 I.L.M. at 417 (Joint Declaration of Judges 
Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, Akl, Marsit, Eiriksson and Jesus) ("The dispute between 
Ireland and the United Kingdom as it appears before the Tribunal is characterized by an 
almost total lack of agreement on the scientific evidence with respect to the possible 
consequences of the operation of the MOX plant on the marine environment of the Irish 
Sea."). 
567 Cases involving the measurement of damages from oil spills illustrate some of the 
complexities involved in measuring damages in an UNCLOS case. See, e.g., P.R. v. SS Zoe 
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 672-78 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding damages from oil spill were 
not limited to loss of market value of the affected property; rather the standard for damages 
was costs reasonably incurred in rehabilitating the environment, without grossly 
disproportionate expenditures, and the district court erred in including replacement value of 
animals killed when it was impractical to replace them until environment healed itself 
through natural processes). 
568 Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (affirming that 
Massachusetts had standing to challenge EPA's regulation of carbon dioxide from vehicles 
because it had demonstrated harm from rising sea levels to its coastal areas), and 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 358 F.3d 626, 650-55 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., 
concurring) (arguing that plaintiffs alleging harm from global impacts of ozone-depleting 
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Electric Power, eight States filed a public nuisance suit in federal district court in 
Manhattan against several large utilities that emit substantial amounts of 
greenhouse gases, but the district court dismissed the case under the political 
question doctrine because the complex policy questions regarding global warming 
were better suited to resolution by the political branches and were nonjusticiable 
political questions beyond the limits of the court's jurisdiction.569 If it is 
questionable whether American courts should allow tort suits against American 
utility companies or the EPA, there is a strong argument that American courts 
should not allow ATS suits that would require them to set pollution limits in 
sovereign foreign countries because of the intensely negative reaction such suits 
are likely in provoke in many foreign nations.57o Instead, nations must negotiate 
better international agreements to address problems such as global warming and 
develop effective mechanisms for reducing transboundary pollution. The success 
of international agreements to limit ozone destroying chemicals demonstrates that 
it is possible to address transboundary pollution problems without the intervention 
of American courts.571 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the Sosa decision promulgates the imprecise standard that modern 
international law norms are enforceable in an ATS suit only if they are widely 
accepted and have a definite content comparable to the eighteenth-century norms, 
the Sosa standard is clear enough to prohibit most international environmental law 
doctrines as the basis of an A TS suit. Because of the inherent complexities of 
environmental issues, international environmental law doctrines are usually broad 
substances should have standing, although acknowledging that prudential considerations 
might limit suits in such cases), and Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is 
Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1 (2005) (arguing in favor of standing in at 
least some climate change suits, but acknowledging contrary arguments), with Blake R. 
Bertagna, Comment, "Standing" Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs to 
Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. 
REV. 415 (2006) (arguing against standing in "substantive" global wanning cases because 
of scientific uncertainties, but acknowledging plaintiffs would have a better chance of 
showing standing in a procedural injury case). 
569 Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power, Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 271-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 
Mank, supra note 568, at 9-10.; accord Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1463--64 (Roberts, 
c.J., dissenting) (arguing that global wanning "crisis" should be resolved in "the Executive 
and Legislative Branches of our Government"). 
570 Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and International Human Rights Litigation: A 
Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1938--43 (2007) (arguing ATS suits 
addressing climate change are politically unacceptable because such suits would require 
American courts to dictate environmental policy to foreign countries, especially relatively 
poor developing countries). 
571 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
TREATY Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; NRDC v. 
EPA, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing implementation of Montreal Protocol). 
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and somewhat vague. For example, the Second Circuit in Flores II and the district 
court in Sarei I agreed that broad principles such as the "right to life," the "right to 
health," or the right to sustainable development are too vague to be enforced in an 
ATS suit.572 
The district court in Sarei I and the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 opinion 
are probably correct that UNCLOS has been ratified by so many nations that it 
codifies customary international law. 573 Even though it has not ratified UNCLOS, 
the United States appears to accept the Convention's baseline provisions as 
such.574 The wide acceptance of UNCLOS, however, is not enough to make it 
enforceable in an A TS suit. 
Both the district court in Sarei I and the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 Sarei 
opinion failed to address whether UNCLOS has a definite content. Superficially, 
the provisions in UNCLOS may appear to be more definite than a concept such as 
sustainable development. Perhaps the superficial specificity of UNCLOS 
convinced the district court in Sarei I and the Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 
opinion that the Convention codified customary international law that could be 
enforced through the ATS. 
A detailed examination of UNCLOS, however, demonstrates that many of its 
marine pollution provisions are vague or unclear. For example, it is unclear how 
much pollution is required or how much harm must result from that pollution to 
trigger its prohibitions against marine, land-based, or transboundary pollution. 
Additionally, it is unclear to what extent a poor country such as Papua New Guinea 
may use less stringent pollution controls than wealthy nations. In the context of an 
A TS suit, there are additional uncertainties about whether a MNC such as Rio 
Tinto is expected to use the same pollution control standards in Papua New Guinea 
as in Australia. As the MOX case suggests, applying UNCLOS to complex 
transboundary pollution problems raises many unanswered questions.575 On 
remand, the district court should hold that the UNCLOS claim is not cognizable 
under the A TS because the content of UNCLOS is not as definite as the norms 
recognized in 1789. 
American courts should generally reject ATS claims based on internal 
pollution in one country because they generally are not of mutual concern to the 
international community. Additionally, U.S. courts should generally reject ATS 
claims based on trans boundary pollution because the liability principles in Trail 
Smelter or the ILC's recent eight draft principles are too vague to meet Sosa's 
requirement that modem international law principles have a definite content 
comparable to eighteenth-century claims such as piracy. Deciding whether 
572 See Flores II, 414 F.3d 233, 254-55 (2nd Cir. 2003); Sarei I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 
1116, 1158, 1160-61 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
573 See SareiI, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1160-63 (C.D. Cal. 2002), ajJ'd in part, vacated 
in part, rev'd in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), afJ'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in 
part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), en banc reh 'g granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Sa rei II, 456 F.3d 1069, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2006). 
574 See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text. 
575 MOX Plant Case, supra note 547. 
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transboundary pollution is significant enough to trigger liability requires the 
consideration of several subjective factors such as the intensity of the pollution, the 
location of the pollution, an evaluation of the scientific evidence and measuring 
damages. For example, in the MOX case, the United Kingdom and Ireland 
vehemently disagreed about the harmfulness of the plant. 576 Because of the 
inherent complexities of transboundary pollution claims, U.S. courts should refuse 
to allow ATS suits based on such claims. Instead, international, regional, or 
bilateral courts or tribunals should decide such cases. 
The Ninth Circuit's withdrawn 2006 opinion probably offers false hopes to 
most environmental plaintiffs. Even if other courts had followed the withdrawn 
2006 opinion's overly broad interpretation of ATS jurisdiction, most 
environmental cases are likely to be dismissed pursuant to the following four 
defenses: (1) the FNC doctrine, (2) the political question doctrine, (3) the act of 
state doctrine, and the (4) the international comity doctrine. In most cases 
involving pollution by MNCs, the government has authorized the polluting 
activity, the pollution has occurred in a foreign country, and most of the witnesses 
are probably still in that foreign country. These factors tend to weigh in favor of 
the application of one or more of the four defenses. The Ninth Circuit in its 
withdrawn 2006 opinion and its 2007 opinion acknowledged that UNCLOS 
provisions did not clearly rise to the level of jus cogens norms that no nation may 
violate, and that is probably true of most environmental claims.577 Even under the 
withdrawn 2006 opinion's liberal interpretation of Sosa 's serious weight standard 
for SOls and other statements by the executive branch, there still was a good 
chance that the district court in Sarei on remand would have dismissed the case. If 
most environmental A TS suits are going to be dismissed eventually under one of 
the four defenses, it would be more efficient to apply a relatively strict 
interpretation of the Sosa standard and find at the beginning of the case that they 
lack a definite content comparable to eighteenth-century offenses and should be 
dismissed. 
Developing countries generally need to apply stricter internal pollution 
control standards, but they must do so under their own initiative rather than 
through interference by American courts. For example, China has finally 
recognized the environmental costs of its tremendous growth and is starting to 
address its pollution problems, although it needs to do far more to reduce 
pollution.578 In Papua New Guinea, according to the plaintiffs' own evidence, it 
576 Id. ~ l. 
577 See Sarei II, 456 F.3d at 1085-86. 
578 See generally Tseming Yang, Introduction: Snapshots of the State of China's 
Environmental Regulatory System, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 145, 145-149 (2007) (discussing 
China's increasing recognition of environmental problems and mixed record in addressing 
them); Symposium, China in Transition: Environmental Challenges in the Far East, 8 VT. 
1. ENVTL. L. 145-472 (2007) (same); Edward H. Ziegler, China's Cities, Globalization, 
and Sustainable Development: Comparative Thoughts on Urban Planning, Energy, and 
Environmental Policy, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REv. 295, 295-322 (2006) 
(discussing China's plans and mixed success in addressing rapid urbanization and increases 
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appears that the government is more willing to address pollution issues now than it 
was in the past. 579 
The ILC's proposal of eight draft principles concerning transboundary 
pollution suggests that there is some progress toward making States responsible for 
transboundary pollution,580 but those principles are too vague to meet Sosa's 
definite content standard.58 ! As the MOX case suggests, regional organizations may 
take a leading role in addressing transboundary pollution.582 Indeed, UNCLOS in 
several provisions recognizes the value of regional standards in addressing marine 
pollution.583 Existing or emerging international, regional or bilateral courts, 
tribunals, or organizations are better suited to addressing transboundary claims 
than U.S. courts in ATS suits. 
If lower courts read Sosa too broadly and allow too many types of A TS suits, 
the Supreme Court may react by limiting such suits. The Supreme Court could 
refine and narrow its comparable to eighteenth-century offense standard, it could 
give more weight to executive branch pronouncements, or it could impose an 
exhaustion of foreign remedies requirement. It is unlikely that the Sosa majority 
wanted to open the door to a wide range of environmental A TS cases. The Ninth 
Circuit's decision to grant a rehearing by the en banc court may reflect its concern 
about an overly broad interpretation by the three-judge panel opinion, although it is 
impossible to know until the Circuit issues its opinion in the case. More likely, the 
majority of the Supreme Court wanted to allow plaintiffs to bring ATS claims 
alleging serious human rights abuses. As the Sarei case demonstrates, cases in the 
developing world involving alleged environmental violations also often involve 
alleged human rights abuses. ATS suits should focus on serious human rights 
abuses that violate well-defined human rights norms rather than complex 
environmental cases that are simply not comparable to the eighteenth-century 
baseline set forth in Sosa. If international environmental law principles eventually 
develop into universal, binding, and clearly defined obligations, courts could then 
recognize them as the proper basis for an A TS suit. 584 
in energy consumption by encouraging alternative transportation and energy sources). 
579 Sarei 1,221 F. Supp. at 1116. 
580 See supra notes 472--488 and accompanying text. 
58! See discussion supra Part VI.B. 
582 MOX Plant Case, supra note 547, ~ 39 (stating that the United Kingdom 
maintained that the matters were governed by "regional agreements providing for 
alternative and binding means of resolving disputes and have actually been submitted to 
such alternative tribunals, or are about to be submitted"). 
583 See UNCLOS, supra note 5. 
584 Christensen, supra note 43, at 1252. 
